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7A B S T R A C T
This study takes a closer look at the visa and consular policies of the
Visegrad countries (V4)—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia—in the context of the recent EU accession and the 
requirements of full integration into the Schengen system. For the 
Visegrad countries’ Eastern neighbors, the requirement to obtain a 
visa, introduced by the V4 to comply with the EU’s Justice and Home 
Aﬀairs acquis, in order to travel to the new Member States was the 
single most disruptive aspect of EU enlargement. The principal aim
of this study, undertaken by research institutes from each of the four 
countries, is thus to assess the feasibility of closer cooperation among 
the Visegrad governments and authorities in order to improve access 
for the citizens of Ukraine and Moldova. 
Thestudystartswitha reviewof the introductionof, andaccumulated
experiences with, the existing visa regimes of the four countries. This
includes an analysis of the various solutions the V4 countries applied in 
order to mitigate the negative consequences of the visa requirement for 
travelers from countries to their East, and an assessment of the current 
practice of issuing visas as seen by both staﬀ at consulates and the visa
applicants themselves. The study then considers the background of
Visegrad cooperation and analyzes possible ways of enhancing such 
cooperation in the area of consular and visa policy vis-à-vis Ukraine 
and Moldova. Finally, a number of concrete recommendations are put 
forward for policymakers working in this area.
9A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
This policy paper presents the ﬁndings and recommendations of a 
multinational project entitled “Feasibility Study for Consular and 
Visa Cooperation Among Visegrad States for Residents of Ukraine 
and Moldova,” conducted by four policy centers under the auspices 
of the Local Government Initiative of the Open Society Institute in 
Budapest from September 2004 until September 2005. Coordinated 
by the Institute of Public Aﬀairs (Poland), the research has been
carried out according to a single methodology by researchers from the 
Center for Policy Studies at Central European University (Hungary), 
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy (Czech Republic), and the 
Slovak Foreign Policy Association as well as IPA. 
The research would not have been possible without the assistance of
the Ministries of Foreign Aﬀairs and the Interior of the four Visegrad
states or the expertise and logistical support of the partner research 
institutions in Ukraine (International Centre for Policy Studies) and 
Moldova (Institute of Public Policy). In particular, we are grateful for 
the contributions of Olena Houmenyuk and Vira Tsypuk from Ukraine 
and Catalina Barbarosie from Moldova, who conducted the ﬁeldwork
in the two countries. 
A longer and more detailed account of this research, “The Visegrad
States between Schengen and Neighborhood,” which forms the basis 
of this policy study, is available from the Institute of Public Aﬀairs,
Warsaw.  The authors are grateful to Agnes Batory (CPS, CEU) for
adapting that publication for the purposes of this policy paper. 
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Requirement to obtain a visa 
most disruptive aspect of  
EU enlargement
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The idea of this comparative paper follows an earlier study by some of
the participating research institutes on the “Impact of EU enlargement 
and the Schengen treaty in the CEE region.” That project demonstrated
that citizens of the Visegrad countries’ Eastern neighbors identiﬁed the
requirement to obtain a visa in order to travel to new EU Member States 
as the single most disruptive aspect of EU enlargement. CIS residents 
with personal or business connections with the Visegrad states have been 
anxious about rising diﬃculties in crossing the border and applying for
long-term residence. The daily experience of travelers requiring visas to
new Member States indicates the existence of a series of obstacles which 
makes visa procedures diﬃcult for applicants, discouraging a signiﬁcant
number of them from entering the process. 
The study takes a closer look at the visa and consular policies of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (the V4). The principal
aim is to assess the feasibility of closer cooperation among these four 
countries in order to improve access to visas and standards of visa-issuing 
procedures for the citizens of Ukraine and Moldova in the context 
of recent EU accession and the requirements of full integration into 
the Schengen system. This in-depth investigation of national policies
has involved a combination of (1) interviews with oﬃcials from the
Ministries of Foreign Aﬀairs, Ministries of the Interior and from the
border guards in the V4 and (2) ﬁeld research, consisting of interviews
with staﬀ of the consulates of the Visegrad states, representatives of travel
agencies, social organizations and individual applicants in Ukraine and 
the Republic of Moldova. The study is the ﬁrst comparative work on
the visa and consular policies of the four Visegrad States towards their 
eastern neighbors. 
Although work on constructing a European dimension for visa and 
consular policies is entering a strategic stage, a lack of consensus on 
the objectives of the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbors appears 
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to leave the new EU Member States with the simultaneous task and 
opportunity to set the agenda for the foreseeable future. The current
study aims to provide relevant information for such an exercise, ﬁrstly
by reviewing existing practices and secondly by assessing the possibilities 
for enhanced cooperation within the Visegrad Group. 
The study is structured in the following way. Part One focuses on
the introduction of, and accumulated experiences with, the existing 
visa regimes of the four countries. This includes a review of the various
solutions the V4 countries have applied in order to mitigate the negative 
consequences of the visa requirement for travelers from countries to 
their East, and an assessment of the current practice of issuing visas as 
seen by both staﬀ at consulates and the visa applicants themselves. Part
Two considers the background of Visegrad cooperation and analyzes 
possible ways of enhancing such cooperation in the area of consular 
and visa policy vis-à-vis Ukraine and Moldova. Finally, Part Three sets
forth a number of recommendations for policymakers working in this 
area. 
Reviewing existing practices 
and assessing the possibilities 
for enhanced cooperation
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PA R T  O N E
The Visa Policies of the Visegrad States:
Political and Technical Aspects
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1 .  I N T R O D U C I N G  V I S A S  A N D  T H E  I M PA C T  O F  
 N E W  V I S A  R E G I M E S
1 . 1  I n t r o d u c i n g  V i s a s
All four countries in the Visegrad Group introduced visas for nationals 
of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine between 2000 and 2003 as part 
of the implementation of the Justice and Home Aﬀairs (JHA) acquis. 
None of the countries requested derogations or transitional periods in 
this area. However, while EU accession was a priority for all four states, 
the approach they adopted in meeting this goal diﬀered considerably
between the Czech- and Slovak Republics on the one hand and Poland 
and Hungary on the other. Diﬀerences in approaches concerned the
timing of imposing a visa obligation on their Eastern neighbors, the 
conditions of the visa agreements themselves as well as the unilateral vs. 
consultative manner in which they were concluded. 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia both introduced visas early. The
reasons for this could be found both in the generally lower priority 
aﬀorded to the CIS group in these countries’ foreign policies and in
the signiﬁcance of the ties between Prague and Bratislava. Upon EU
accession, the Czech Republic was likely to be in a unique position 
among the four Visegrad states as the only country with no external 
EU borders, which makes full integration into the Schengen zone a 
relative gain with little sacriﬁce. The absence of a direct land border
with Ukraine also diminished the salience of preserving cross-border 
economic and people-to-people contact.1 At the same time, the country 
has had unique incentives to introduce restrictions. It was the only state 
in the Visegrad Group which, at the time, bordered on two existing EU 
members (Austria and Germany), thus ﬁnding itself under signiﬁcant
The Czech Republic was  
in a unique position with  
no external EU borders
1 It should be noted that the issue of the small Czech minority in Western Ukraine, the 
Volyne Czechs, was not considered as fundamental to the country’s visa policy.
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pressure to tighten border controls early on. In addition, by the early 
2000s, regulation of the movement of Ukrainian nationals was felt 
to be necessary as the Czech Republic had been the target of labor 
migration from Ukraine. 
Visa-free policies were terminated by the Czech Republic by 
unilateral declaration in the form of diplomatic notes eﬀective as of
June 28 (Ukraine) and October 22, 2000 (Moldova). In response, 
both Ukraine and Moldova introduced full-scale visa policies for 
Czech citizens. The Czech Republic’s announcement in February 2000
of its decision to revoke long-standing agreements with Ukraine and 
Moldova also provided the main impetus for the Slovak Government, 
which followed suit in March with its resolution to introduce visas 
for Ukrainian citizens on June 28, 2000. Rapid introduction of 
visas as regards non-EU states was considered a necessary sacriﬁce in
order to maintain the symbolic and in practice crucial preferential 
policy allowing relative freedom of movement and residence for the 
nationals of the two successor states to Czechoslovakia. Kyiv responded 
by imposing a visa obligation on Slovak citizens from that date on. 
However, being a neighboring country, Slovakia was more aﬀected by
a consecutive move by the Ukrainian authorities, which renounced the 
readmission treaty in October 2000. This meant a radical reversal in
the protection of common borders and the control of the movement of 
illegal immigrants from Ukraine to Slovakia. 
Hungary and Poland too pledged to comply with Directive No. 
574/99 of the Council of the European Communities, which required 
the introduction of visas for the citizens of the 15 former communist 
countries by the time of accession, without asking for any derogations 
or transitional periods in the JHA area. However, in contrast with the 
Czech and Slovak approach, these countries resisted repeated calls from 
the European Commission in consecutive progress reports to align their 
visa policies as soon as possible. Instead, both states announced during 
accession negotiations that they would not complete the process until 
six months before the expected date of EU entry, and sought solutions 
Slovakia was more affected
Hungary and Poland sought 
solutions that would be 
acceptable to Kyiv
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that would be acceptable to Kyiv as well. Their preferred approach
consisted of gradual harmonization, based on pre-announced schedules 
and taking national interests into account. The timetable allowed for
early moves vis-à-vis non-European states, followed by action towards 
those European states with which Poland or Hungary maintained looser 
ties, concluding with the core group of countries considered to be of 
special signiﬁcance for national foreign policy.
Although the eventual policies adopted by Budapest and Warsaw 
were in many respects parallel, the two administrations relied on 
arguments that were ﬁrmly rooted in their speciﬁc domestic policy
priorities. The Hungarian strategy was built on one of the key pillars of
national foreign policy: protecting the interests of ethnic compatriots 
living across the country’s borders. Hungarian diplomacy sought 
to postpone moves towards neighboring countries with Hungarian 
minorities—including Ukraine where approximately 150,000 Hun-
garians live in the Transcarpathian region—until the last possible 
moment, i.e. six months prior to accession. 
Despite the Commission’s persistent demands to introduce visa 
requirements for all 15 countries, Poland extended the right of visa-free 
entry as late as the middle of 2000. In the case of Poland, this delay 
also reﬂected a broader diﬀerence in the manner in which this country
on the one hand and the EU and its Member States on the other 
viewed the issue of travel for Belarussians, Russians and Ukrainians 
across the future external border. Unlike the existing EU members, 
which tended to consider the entry of third-country nationals into EU 
territory primarily as a policing issue within the JHA acquis, Poland’s 
visa policy towards its neighbors was seen as part and parcel of the 
country’s foreign policy. Consequently, the approach both Hungary 
and Poland adopted—albeit for diﬀerent reasons—aimed to minimize
harm to bilateral relations with the countries concerned, and was seen 
as representing a higher priority than for either the Czech Republic or 
(to some extent) Slovakia. 
Approximately 150,000 
Hungarians live in the 
Transcarpathian region
Poland’s visa policy seen  
as part and parcel of the 
country’s foreign policy
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1 . 2  I m p a c t  o n  L e g a l  C r o s s - b o r d e r  T r a f f i c
Poland and Hungary backed up their policies to impose visas as late as 
possible with impact analyses (based on domestic or foreign experience), 
which indicated that in the absence of adequate compensatory measures 
signiﬁcant declines in the number of travelers were to be expected.
The experiences of Slovakia, the only EU candidate state neighboring
Ukraine that introduced visas far ahead of accession, also pointed in 
this direction. The introduction in June 2000 of visas for the citizens
of Ukraine—representing over 90 percent of all persons crossing the 
Slovak border in 1999—resulted in the collapse of cross-border traﬃc
generally. By the end of 2000, the number of entries and departures 
across the border dropped by half compared to the year before and the 
ﬁgures for 2001 represented a mere 27 percent of the volume recorded
in 1999. Although a steady increase has been recorded since 2001, the 
numbers remain far below the pre-visa level to the present day.2
The Slovak case was also instructive in terms of how far the changes
aﬀected travelers of diﬀerent citizenships (Table 1). Firstly, local traﬃc
proved to be far more vulnerable to the introduction of administrative 
and ﬁnancial barriers than long-distance transit traﬃc from non-
neighboring CIS states, such as Belarus and Russia. The number of
Ukrainian travelers dwindled over two years (1999–2001) to one-
ﬁfth of the pre-visa traﬃc. Secondly, although Ukraine retaliated by 
introducing visa requirements for Slovaks, travel by Slovak citizens across 
the border was aﬀected to a far lesser extent. In fact, by 2002 border
crossing by Slovaks returned to the levels of 1998 and nearly doubled 
between 2002 and 2003. The visa fee (24 USD for a single entry) thus
constituted a far greater barrier to generally poorer Ukrainian nationals 
than to Slovak citizens. 
2 Oﬃce of the Border and Aliens Police, Presidium of the Police Corps of the Slovak
Republic (September 2005).
Travel by Slovak citizens 
across the border was affected 
to a far lesser extent
Slovak visas 
resulted in the collapse of 
cross-border trafﬁc
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Table 1. 
Number of legal entries into Slovakia through Slovak-Ukrainian 
border crossings from the territory of Ukraine, 1998–2003  
(number of crossings by persons in thousands)
Travelers  
by citizenship
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Slovakia 76 63 53 54 76 140
Ukraine 1,727 1,435 621 291 335 400
Visa-free countries 69 58 53 33 37 34
Countries with a 
Visa Obligation
3 2 11 25 25 26
Total 1,875 1,558 738 403 473 602
Source: Oﬃce of the Border and Aliens Police, Presidium of the Police Corps of the
Slovak Republic, September 2005.
Even though the visa policy imposed in June 2000 did not aﬀect
foreign trade exchange at the national Slovak—Ukrainian level, it did 
have an impact on “shuttle trade” among inhabitants of neighboring 
regions on both sides of the common state border. Prior to imposing 
visas, illegal or semi-legal trade with neighboring countries had become 
one of the main activities of Transcarpathian inhabitants who frequently 
carried alcoholic beverages and cigarettes across the border. Although 
there are no oﬃcial data on the volume of such trade in the Slovak—
Ukrainian borderland, the following trends are indicative: the number 
of buses which crossed the Slovak—Ukrainian border from Ukraine 
dropped from 13,265 in 1999 to  3,894 in 2001 (a decline of over 
70 percent) and from Slovakia from 15,449 in 1999 to 3,701 in 2001 
(a drop of 76 percent).3 
3 Oﬃce of the Border and Aliens Police of the Slovak Republic, Presidium of the Police
Corps of the Slovak Republic (March 2003).
Impact on “shuttle trade”
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Recognition of the extent to which local communities and 
economies were vulnerable to the burden of the cost of visas led to 
Slovakia’s adoption of more liberal visa procedures for the permanent 
residents of 83 villages on both sides of the border in March 2001. 
Residents of those villages were granted right of entry on the basis of 
multiple-entry visas free of charge and the Slovak consulate in Uzhhorod 
took on more staﬀ in order to handle the processing of a higher number
of applications. By the following year the volume of cross-border traﬃc
increased by one-sixth, indicating that even limited policy measures 
were eﬀective in producing a gradual but immediate recovery after a
very steep initial decline. 
Although the Slovak experience conﬁrmed the validity of strategies
that would prevent high levels of disruption to cross-border traﬃc for
Poland and Hungary, their policies responded to domestic concerns that 
had been raised a few years earlier. The Polish example is particularly
instructive. As part of the process of harmonizing the Polish legislation 
with the acquis, the new Act on Aliens, adopted on June 26, 1997, 
introduced more restrictions on the entry and residence of foreigners 
in the country as part of the country’s eﬀorts to combat illegal
immigration. The law restricted access to documents required for travel
and introduced stricter controls with regard to the ﬁnancial means at
travelers’ disposal by the border guards. These new administrative travel
restrictions were considered to be a signiﬁcant contributing factor in
the collapse of the cross-border “open-air market” trade in 1998.
 In the wake of public and parliamentary criticism, changes in 
procedures for CIS travelers’ access to Polish territory were determined 
to have ramiﬁcations far beyond the technical issues of legal and
institutional harmonization with the EU. The Ministry of Interior
was to introduce changes in close collaboration with the Ministry of 
Foreign Aﬀairs, which monitored the impact on bilateral relations, and
with the Ministry of the Economy, which pointed out the economic 
consequences for the borderland regions. The Government as a whole
recognized that changes to the visa policy needed to go through extensive 
interministerial consultations and that the matter should be settled at 
Limited policy measures 
were effective in producing 
a gradual recovery
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the level of the Council of Ministers. New policy changes also had to 
involve relevant social partners and independent experts to a far greater 
extent. Thus, the new visa policy, implemented for CIS neighbors in
2000–2003, was made a high priority and became a matter of close 
scrutiny.
Forecasts on the estimated number of visas that would have to be 
issued under the new policy were conducted by the Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Aﬀairs, concluding that up to 1.1 million applications for short-
term tourist visas could be expected from citizens of Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus annually.4 This ﬁgure was four times greater than the total
number of visas issued by all Polish consulates annually prior to the 
introduction of the new policy for CIS nationals. Estimates showed 
that the demand for the services of existing consulates was due to rise 
exponentially. In Ukraine the total demand for visas was estimated 
to be about 555,000, accentuating the need to develop the consular 
network (including the opening of new consulates).5
Even so, Poland, the only country in the Visegrad Group to 
neighbor three CIS states, has not managed to stem a continuing 
decline in the number of travelers from its Eastern neighbors. In 2004, 
the inﬂow of travelers was 30 percent lower than in 2001, which may
be attributed to the long-term eﬀects of the Russian ﬁnancial crisis and
recent appreciation of the Polish currency (Table 2). In the short term, 
the requirement to apply for visas compounded the drop. However, 
movement by travelers who enjoyed visa fee waivers (Ukrainians 
and Russians) has recovered faster than among those required to 
pay (Belarussians), which suggests that compensatory measures and 
facilitated conditions of entry made a diﬀerence.
4 Krystyna Iglicka and Robert Rybicki, Schengen—consequences for national migration 
policy, IPA, 2002.
5 Information about the results of budget control at selected foreign missions, Supreme 
Chamber of Control, Public Administration Department, February 2003, pp. 10–12. 
(http://www.nik.gov.pl/wyniki_kontroli/dokumenty/2003009.pdf )
New Polish visa policy became  
a matter of close scrutiny
Continuing decline in the 
number of travelers from 
Eastern neighbors
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Table 2. 
Number of border entries by CIS citizens into Poland  
(in thousands per year)
Travelers by 
citizenship
2001 2002 2003 2004
Ukraine 6,418 5,853 4,830 4,523
Belarus 5,197 4,242 3,830 3,523
Russia 1,969 1,844 1,534 1,420
Source: SOPEMI 2004, s. 41; Polish Tourist Organization (www.intur.com.pl)
The statistics for the other country that introduced visas at a later
time and dropped visa fees for Ukrainian citizens similarly point to a 
short-term signiﬁcant decline. In the ﬁrst month when visa requirements
were in force, November 2003, the number of Ukrainians entering 
Hungary declined by 54 percent relative to the month before (down 
from over 255,000 to nearly 117,000 in absolute numbers).6 In the 
longer term as well, the legal movement of citizens of both Ukraine 
and Serbia and Montenegro into Hungary—which for years before 
had been rising—showed a clear declining trend. From 2002 to 2004, 
the number of Ukrainians legally crossing the border into Hungary 
declined by more than 10 percent and the number of citizens of Serbia 
and Montenegro declined by 20 percent (see Table 3). However, this 
decline was slightly smaller than the decline registered at the Polish-
Ukrainian border and much less pronounced than in the case of 
Ukrainians crossing the border with Slovakia.
6 Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃce, January 2005.
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Table 3. 
Legal entries of citizens of Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro into 
Hungary and of Hungarian nationals into Ukraine and Serbia and 
Montenegro (in thousands per year)
Travelers 2002 2003 2004
Citizens of Ukraine entering Hungary 2,569 2,512 2,275
Citizens of Hungary entering Ukraine 672 1,167 2,202
Citizens of Serbia Montenegro entering 
Hungary
2,872 2,593 2,327
Citizens of Hungary entering Serbia and 
Montenegro
531 531 713
Source: Central Statistical Oﬃce, January 2003, January 2004, January 2005.
It is notable that, against the background of declining numbers 
of border crossings by citizens of neighboring states into the new EU 
Member States, the amount of trips made by Hungarian, Polish or 
Slovak citizens to Ukraine and other non-EU neighbors actually rose 
in this period. This trend was not broken by the introduction of the
new visa regimes, and was accelerated especially in cases of asymmetric 
regimes that guaranteed Hungarian or Polish nationals visa-free entry, 
while it followed liberalization of reciprocal Slovak-Ukrainian border-
crossing procedures. Rapid expansion in the amount of travel by 
new EU citizens to their non-EU neighbors not only testiﬁes to the
persistence of cultural, economic and ethnic ties, but the contrast in the 
trends in travel patterns of the residents on the two sides of the border 
also indicates that an improvement in border infrastructure stimulates 
cross-border traﬃc. This eﬀect, however, is considerably mitigated
when the improvement of the physical conditions for crossing the 
border is accompanied by administrative burdens the price of which is 
far beyond the travelers’ means.
Rapid expansion in the amount 
of travel by new EU citizens  
to their non-EU neighbors
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1 . 3  I m p a c t  o n  I l l e g a l  C r o s s - b o r d e r  T r a f f i c  
  a n d  M i g r a t i o n
Moldova and Ukraine are the only two European countries among the 
“top ten” sources of illegal migrants. Yet, the experience of the Visegrad 
states does not indicate a clear relationship between the introduction 
of visas for Ukrainian or Moldovan citizens and combating illegal 
migration or other forms of cross-border criminality. In Hungary, the 
number of successful and attempted illegal border crossings declined as 
a result of reinforced border controls, but other crimes associated with 
illegal migration were recorded more frequently following the entry 
into force of the visa policy. Human traﬃcking increased by one-third
between 2002 and 2004, forgery of oﬃcial documents (primarily visas
and residence permits) by 68 percent, illegal entry and residence by 44 
percent, and other oﬀenses concerning the policing of aliens by half.
Between 2002 and 2004 the steepest increase in cross-border oﬀenses
was found among citizens of Ukraine and Moldova. The number of
Ukrainians committing crimes associated with illegal migration rose 
over threefold, and the number of Moldovan nationals involved in 
such crimes more than doubled. The number of Ukrainian citizens
committing the crime of human traﬃcking also increased almost
fourfold, while the number of Ukrainian citizens illegally “traﬃcked”
into Hungary increased more than tenfold. The number of criminals
of Ukrainian and Moldovan nationality committing forgery of oﬃcial
documents (visas and residence permits in particular) increased 
respectively by sevenfold and threefold in the same period.7
The introduction of visas has also coincided with a rise in
apprehensions of Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens by the Polish 
Guard since 2002. The trend became clearly apparent as cases of
illegal border crossings within those two national groups, along with 
Russian citizens, rose sharply: From 2002 to 2004 the number more 
7 Interview with the Hungarian Border Guards National Headquarters, January 2005.
Moldova and Ukraine 
are  among the “top ten” 
sources of illegal migrants
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than tripled for Ukrainians and quadrupled for Moldovans while the 
ﬁgures for all the other top nationalities were stagnant or dropped. By
2004, every ﬁfth person apprehended by the Polish border guards on
the country’s borders was a Ukrainian; the next three national groups 
were Russians, Czechs (a majority of them stray tourists in mountain 
regions) and Moldovans, far exceeding once dominant Asian countries 
(such as China, India or Sri Lanka).8
The introduction of visas was followed by a rise in detention of
citizens of Ukraine and Moldova on the Slovak—Ukrainian border 
as well. While the trend in the detention of Ukrainians was relatively 
stable before, the ﬁgure doubled between 2001 and 2002, although
this group still represents less than one percent of all detainees. On 
the other hand, the number of detained nationals of the Republic of 
Moldova rose exponentially and skyrocketed in the second year of visa 
requirements (2002), rising sixfold year by year in Slovakia. The trend
continued so that the number of illegal migrants from Moldova in the 
second half of 2004 nearly doubled compared to the same period in 
2003. According to estimates from the Oﬃce of Border and Aliens
Police, citizens of Moldova account for almost one third of all illegal 
economic migrants in the Slovak Republic.9 In response, as of October 
10, 2004 Slovakia unilaterally imposed—as a temporary measure to 
be reviewed in light of further statistical data—a more restrictive visa 
policy for Moldova. 
Citizens of Ukraine only represent a fraction of persons illegally 
crossing the borders of the Czech Republic. However, Ukrainian citizens 
account for a signiﬁcant segment of foreigners arrested or deported
for violation of the residence policy (e.g. overstaying a short-term visa 
or illegal employment). In 2003, over 17,000 Ukrainian nationals 
8 E. Kepinska, Recent trends in international migration: The 2004 SOPEMI report for
Poland, Seria Place Migracyjne No 56, ISS UW, Warsaw 2004, table 50; and Polish 
Border Guard for data on 2004.
9 Oﬃce of the Border and Aliens Police, Presidium of the Police Corps of the Slovak
Republic, September 2005.
The number of detained 
nationals of the Republic  
of Moldova skyrocketed  
in Slovakia
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were found to be in breach of these regulations, representing 79.7 
percent of such cases, while Moldovan citizens accounted for only 1.9 
percent. Moreover, the termination of the visa-free policy with Ukraine 
and Moldova triggered a radical increase in the number of asylum 
applications by Ukrainians living in the Czech Republic at the time of 
the introduction of short-term visas.10 In the vast majority of cases, the 
applications were found to be ill-founded: the primary motivation was 
the possibility to work legally in the Czech Republic during the asylum 
procedure. Consequently, following a 2002 amendment to the labor 
legislation, which limited the right of asylum seekers to work legally, 
the number of asylum applications from Ukrainians and Moldovans 
dropped signiﬁcantly.
Ukrainian citizens form the second largest national group (after 
Slovaks) among foreigners on the Czech labor market. At the end of 
2004, 41,855 Ukrainians were oﬃcially economically active in the
Czech Republic, representing 24 percent of the foreign labor force 
(in comparison, Moldovans made up about one percent). Ukrainian 
nationals are also the second largest foreign community in the Czech 
Republic after Slovak citizens. In 2004, the number of Ukrainian 
citizens with long-term (over 90 days) or permanent residence permits 
came to over 78,000, or 30 percent, of which 65,000 hold long-
term residence status. Ukrainian nationals form the largest group of 
foreigners with long-term status on Czech territory. In comparison, the 
number of nationals of Moldova was only a little above 4,000 persons, 
putting them in eighth place among the various nationalities.
Clearly, the eﬀects of visa introduction were underestimated by
the Czech government. Possible causes include poor coordination 
between the Foreign Ministry (which did not perceive imposing visas 
as a problem because of Ukraine’s low priority in Czech foreign policy 
A radical increase 
in the number of asylum 
applications by Ukrainians 
living in the Czech Republic
10 David Kral, “Implications of the Schengen Acquis for the socio-economic reality in 
the Czech Republic,” p. 22. 
 (http://www.isp.org.pl/ﬁles/17975279730059364001118153404.pdf ).
Poor coordination between 
the Foreign Ministry and the 
Ministry of the Interior
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and the indisputable primacy of EU accession) and the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs (which must have
been aware of the issue of Ukrainian migration already at this stage). As 
the overall estimates of Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic (over 
200,000 persons) signiﬁcantly exceed the number of residence permits
according to the oﬃcial data, the question remains as to how many are
in the Czech Republic illegally.
2 .  M I T I G AT I N G  A N D  C O M P E N S ATO R Y  M E A S U R E S
 
2 . 1  A d a p t i n g  t h e  C o n s u l a r  N e t w o r k  
  a n d  Pa r t i a l  L i b e r a l i z a t i o n
Countries adopting early unilateral moves initially saw no need for 
any signiﬁcant compensatory measures to mitigate the impact of
introducing visas for persons arriving from Ukraine and Moldova. 
Neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia have established an embassy 
or consulate in Chisinau, instead retaining the Republic of Moldova 
within the jurisdiction of their embassies in Bucharest and arranging 
visits by the consuls to the Moldovan capital. The two states opened
their representations in western Ukraine considerably later than either 
Poland or Hungary: the Czech consulate in Lviv began operating in 
January 2004, while the Slovak consulate in Uzhhorod followed the 
Hungarian one located there by several years. 
On the other hand, the states that have chosen to introduce visas 
gradually in consultation with the neighboring countries’ authorities 
were careful to adapt their consular networks for the challenge. The
existing consular oﬃces of Poland in Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv were to
be expanded to accommodate greater demand and two new consular 
oﬃces were to be established in Lutsk (western Ukraine) and Odessa
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(to cover the southern part of the country). Thus Poland not only
managed to cover the country relatively evenly with its consular oﬃces,
but also ensured that two of its ﬁve consulates were located in the direct
vicinity of the border where most of the demand was expected. All 
the consulates were to be reinforced with more consuls and as many 
as 250 local staﬀ were to be hired by the 12 Polish consulates in the
three countries. All the oﬃces were to be supplied with the necessary
equipment and computer systems, while training was to be provided to 
the Foreign Ministry’s staﬀ at the Head Oﬃce and in the ﬁeld.
Hungary’s preparations focused on the Transcarpathian region of 
Ukraine, from where the overwhelming majority of visa applicants 
was expected, given the concentration of the Hungarian minority. 
Hungary’s objective was to prevent the need to travel long distances 
to the consulate in order to obtain a visa. As a result, new consular 
and customer service oﬃces were opened in Hungarian-populated
areas (Berehovo and Uzhhorod), which raised the total number of 
oﬃces issuing visas in Ukraine to three. These measures did not just
beneﬁt the Hungarian minority but the population of Transcarpathia
in general, as the ethnic Hungarians turned out to be a minority among 
the visa applicants. The budget of the consular network in Ukraine and
Serbia and Montenegro was increased and an additional 30 consular 
and administrative staﬀ were employed and received training. An
online “consular information system” (covering 98 Hungarian consular 
oﬃces) was developed, and the technical infrastructure of the consular
network and the Oﬃce of Immigration and Nationality was improved.
As a result of these preparations, the introduction of the new system 
went relatively smoothly.
The two states which initially imposed full-scale visa policies for
Ukraine also reconsidered their positions over time. Slovakia reacted 
relatively quickly as the second half of 2000 demonstrated a drop in the 
volume of cross-border traﬃc and a negative economic impact on the
country’s economically depressed eastern borderlands. As a result, after 
negotiations with intergovernmental expert groups, an agreement was 
concluded on the alleviation of the visa policy as of March 1, 2001. Key 
New consular and customer 
service ofﬁces were opened
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features of the agreement included dropping the obligation to submit 
an invitation letter attached to the visa application form, granting free 
visas to citizens under 16 years of age, designing multiple-entry visas for 
some categories of citizens, and halving visa fees for persons traveling 
for cultural, sports, educational or religious reasons. In return, Ukraine 
did not withdraw from the 1993 bilateral readmission agreement 
with Slovakia and, currently, holders of Slovak diplomatic and service 
passports are exempt from visa requirements.
Further progress in the liberalization of the visa policy depends on 
solving the issue of readmission, which still represents an area of tension 
in bilateral Slovak—Ukrainian relations as Slovakia remains Ukraine’s 
only western neighbor with which it has not yet concluded a treaty 
on facilitating border procedures. The main challenge for advancing
bilateral negotiations is still that Slovakia is making its agreement to 
further liberalization of the visa policy conditional on readiness by 
Ukraine to sign the “model readmission agreement” required by the 
EU. However, Ukraine argues that it wants to conclude one single 
readmission agreement with the EU and not a series of bilateral 
agreements with individual EU Member States. 
From 2002 to 2004, the number of Czech visa applications in 
Ukraine was around 70,000 per year and a slight rise in applications 
has been observed recently. This required a gradual expansion of staﬀ at
the Kyiv consulate and the establishment of another consulate in Lviv 
in January 2004. The rise in the number of applications is matched by
the growth of rejected applications: up to six percent of applications 
lodged in Kyiv are rejected driven by concerns about likely involvement 
in illegal employment. In turn, the number of visa applications from 
citizens of Moldova has slightly decreased since their introduction—
from around 3,000 applications in 2002 to 2,720 in 2003 and 2,700 in 
2004. A substantial number of applications are rejected but the rate is 
declining: from 19 percent in 2003 to 14 percent in 2004. In Moldova, 
the improvement is credited to greater awareness of the conditions for 
obtaining a visa and the opportunity to enter the Czech Republic with 
a Romanian passport without a visa. 
The issue of readmission
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Ukraine’s Orange Revolution opened up new opportunities for the 
liberalization of visa policies with Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In 
particular, the Yushchenko administration’s temporary unilateral lifting 
of visa requirements for all EU citizens traveling to Ukraine for less 
than 90 days prompted the Czech and Slovak Governments’ decisions 
to abolish fees for short-term visas for Ukrainians as of May 1, 2005. 
(Subsequently, when Ukraine declared its intention to abolish the 
visa obligation for EU citizens for an unlimited period, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia reacted by extending their fee waivers 
accordingly.) This created, de facto, an asymmetric policy between the 
two states and Ukraine, similar to that found between Ukraine on the 
one hand and Hungary and Poland on the other. The change had a
clear and rapid impact on cross-border traﬃc, leading to a 35 percent
increase in the number of applications to the Czech consulate in Kyiv 
since May 1, 2005. 
However, the measures introduced by the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia do not represent a comprehensive solution. Firstly, the current 
arrangements for short-term visas will be terminated upon the full 
accession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to the Schengen system. 
(The measures were communicated through diplomatic notes and not
through standard international treaties, enabling the two Visegrad 
countries to easily change their policies in conforming to the Schengen 
acquis). Secondly, the abolition of visa fees only covers short-term visas 
(with a validity of up to 90 days), while the fees for long-term visa 
applications (the majority of them for employment purposes) have 
remained in force.11 
A comparable asymmetrical visa policy towards Moldova is not 
currently planned. In this case, from the Czech Republic’s perspective 
the best negotiation mechanism is at the EU-Moldova level. The lower
priority of relations with Moldova is indicated by the fact that the Czech 
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 
opened up new opportunities
11 The fees (approximately USD 100 in mid-2005 for Czech long-term visas) are charged
when the application is made and are non-reimbursable in case of refusal.
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Republic has no diplomatic or consular representation in the country, 
and instead operates from its consulate in Bucharest. The Slovak
Republic follows the same practice. With no short-term visa obligation 
for Romanian citizens, the greater part of the work-load of the Czech 
and Slovak consulates in Bucharest concerns Moldovan applicants. 
Following a recent shift in policy, however, the Czech Republic signaled 
its intention to open its diplomatic and consular representation in 
Chisinau. This step is even more signiﬁcant in the context of a general
reduction of Czech diplomatic representation abroad. 
Some mitigating procedures are also expected in the realm of 
long-term Czech visas for Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens. Of all 
the Visegrad states, Czech visa policy is particularly preoccupied with 
issues of labor migration. A pilot program for regulated migration of 
skilled employees, supported by the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social 
Aﬀairs, covered Moldova in October 2004, and Ukraine is expected to
be included as of January 1, 2006. 
2 . 2  A s y m m e t r i c  V i s a  R e g i m e s
The two Visegrad states which chose to delay the introduction of visas
also sought to facilitate entry for their immediate non-EU neighbors 
in other ways. As the country with the longest stretch of the future 
external EU frontier, Poland paved the way in this respect. The solution
was found in a mutually beneﬁcial asymmetric policy. On February
13, 2003, the Presidents of Ukraine and Poland declared that Ukraine 
would not introduce visas for Polish citizens, while Polish short-term 
visas would be free of charge for Ukrainian nationals. A precondition 
for this was the conclusion of readmission agreements with Ukraine 
and Moldova (as the only CIS states to agree to this) as part of the EU-
envisaged regime of border management in the (future) enlarged EU.
 The provision of visas free of charge also represented the most
signiﬁcant preferential measure accorded by Hungary to citizens of
Polish short-term visas free of 
charge for Ukrainian nationals
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Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro. Although, in retrospect, the 
example of the “Polish model” appears to have played a role in adopting 
this solution, the move was also favored by representatives of Hungarian 
minorities in neighboring states and the governments of those states. 
Public concerns and opposition parties also clearly played a role. In 
response, the Governments of Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro 
did not apply reciprocity for the introduction of visas, and Hungarian 
citizens can continue to enter these countries without having to obtain 
a visa. 
The asymmetric policies introduced by Hungary and Poland include
a number of other preferential conditions as well. Firstly, simpliﬁed
visa application forms containing fewer questions were introduced for 
the period leading up to full Schengen integration. Persons holding 
valid visas or residence permits from Schengen states were exempt from 
the requirement to apply for transit visas to cross through Hungary 
or Poland. Secondly, both states speciﬁed in bilateral agreements with
their non-EU neighbors groups of applicants to whom multiple-entry 
visas would be issued. Poland initially chose to issue visas with a validity 
of up to one year to persons with established formal business ties and 
transportation company workers, while Hungary oﬀered multiple-entry
visas valid for ﬁve years to a broad range of categories of travelers. These
categories included people with family ties, those regularly visiting the 
grave of relatives buried in Hungary, or those involved in enhancing 
economic, cultural, scientiﬁc, educational, etc. relations between the
two countries. Poland followed suit when, from November 15, 2004, 
multi-entry, long-term visas were introduced for Ukrainian citizens 
with more permanent (family, business or culture and sport-related) 
ties with Poland to stay in the country for a total of one year within a 
period of ﬁve years.12 
Preferential conditions
12 It turned out that limiting residence to one year seriously put a damper on demand 
while long-term duration made consuls hesitant to issue such visas. As a result, long-
term visas represent a fraction of those issued by Polish consuls.
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In view of the forecasted exponential rise in the number of visas 
that would have to be issued, the Polish and Hungarian governments 
also introduced procedures to limit waiting times at consulates. All 
the Polish consulates in the CIS with the exception of Lviv and Lutsk 
(where over 1,000 applications per day were submitted) adopted the 
principle of issuing visas on the day of application; and all consulates 
were to process applications within four working days. The Hungarian
authorities speciﬁed a ﬁve-day long maximum waiting time and, as in
the Polish case, decisions were to be taken immediately in emergencies 
(e.g. to receive medical treatment, to visit a sick family member, to 
attend a funeral, etc.). This represented a signiﬁcant departure from the
normal period of 30 days allowed for decisions on visa applications. The
Hungarian practice also allowed for visas for 15 days to be exceptionally 
obtained at the border (the Polish Border Guard lost its earlier right to 
issue visas on the frontier in 2003).
Forecasts about the rise in visa applications proved realistic in both 
the Hungarian and Polish cases. The total number of visas issued by
Hungary more than doubled between 2002 (the last year with no visa 
requirement for Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro) and 2003, only 
to double again from 2003 to 2004. As a result, in two years the total 
number of Hungarian visas issued increased more than fourfold to 
reach over 573,000. The number of short-term visas for stays of up
to 90 days is given in Table 4.13 In 2003, visas issued to nationals of 
Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro represented almost 30 percent 
of the total number of visas issued by Hungary, even though the visa 
requirements were only in place during the last two months of the 
year. In 2004, nearly three-quarters of all visas were distributed to 
citizens from these two countries: 40 percent of all visas were allocated 
to residents of Serbia and Montenegro and 33 percent to nationals of 
Ukraine. These ﬁgures indicate the scale of eﬀorts needed to maintain
levels of pre-visa traﬃc.
13 A and B type transit visas are not required for Ukrainian citizens and long-term visas 
for work and other purposes were also required previously.
Procedures to limit  
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Table 4. 
Hungarian visa statistics from before and after the introduction of 
visa requirements for Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro and Moldova
Number of visas issued to citizens of: 2002 2003 2004
Moldova  32,535  42,388  43,079
Ukraine —  50,393 187,676
Serbia and Montenegro —  32,449 230,668
All countries 124,172 283,139 573,395
Source: Oﬃce of Immigration and Nationality.
To put these ﬁgures in context, the total number of visas issued by
Hungary in Ukraine is second only to Poland, twice as many visas issued 
by Germany, and only marginally fewer than all the Schengen Member 
States combined. In 2004, Hungarian consulates in Ukraine issued a 
total of 212,379 visas. Forecasts of the demand, which was estimated 
at 250,000 per year in the whole of Ukraine before the introduction 
of the visa requirement, thus proved to be only slightly excessive. The
ﬁrst quarter of 2005 brought a 13 percent drop in the number of visas
issued, down to less than 50,000. Hungary’s liberal approach to visa 
policy is also reﬂected in the extremely low rate of refusal to Ukrainian
applicants, standing at fewer than 0.2 percent of all the applications 
placed in Kyiv, and similarly low in the other two oﬃces.14
Hungary introduced visa requirements for Moldovan citizens as of 
June 1, 2001. However, mutual visa free travel has been maintained 
for the holders of diplomatic and service passports and their family 
members for up to 90 days. Demand for visas and the number of visas 
issued to Moldovan citizens have been on the rise since the introduction 
of the visa agreement. An increase of over 30 percent was noted between 
14 To compare: the average rate of refusal at the representations of Schengen Member 
States in Ukraine was above 13 percent in 2004.
Number of visas issued by 
Hungary in Ukraine 
only marginally fewer than 
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2002 and 2004, up from 33,000 of applications made in 2002 to 
43,300 in 2004. The refusal rate remains low (less than one percent of
applications ﬁled), although the numbers have risen signiﬁcantly. The
high rate of approval and the low (although increasing) rate of refusal is 
due to the fact that, until 2004, the visa section did not possess suitable 
equipment and know-how to ﬁlter out falsiﬁed documents. Thus quite
often it was the border guards that stopped and turned back people 
who had previously managed to obtain visas with falsiﬁed documents.
Another possible reason for the recently increasing refusal rate is that, 
since November 2004, decisions on applications for short-stay (type 
C) visas are made by the Oﬃce of Immigration and Nationality in
Hungary and not by the consuls on site.
Hungary introduced visa requirements for Moldova at the same time 
as Poland (in 2001) and the number of applicants is currently around 
40,000 per year. Although Moldova has requested an asymmetrical 
arrangement similar to the one concluded with Poland, Hungary has 
refused to grant preferential treatment to Moldovan nationals along the 
lines applied to Ukrainians or citizens of Serbia and Montenegro.15 The
reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, there is no interest comparable 
with the cases of Ukraine or Serbia and Montenegro since Moldova 
is not a neighboring country and there are no Hungarian minorities 
there. Secondly, opposition is based on public safety considerations 
since signiﬁcant numbers of Moldovan nationals enter Hungary legally
but exit illegally in transit to the West. Thirdly, issuing visas free of
charge would further cut into the budget of the consular system whose 
work has greatly increased with the introduction of visa requirements. 
Apart from the cost of the visas, another “deterrent” to applicants is the 
standard waiting time of 30 days, and the accelerated procedure is only 
available at a signiﬁcantly higher cost. On the other hand, Hungary
liberalized the policy for Moldovan holders of diplomatic passports, 
which Poland granted only to Ukrainian diplomats.
15 The Moldovan government concluded an asymmetric visa agreement with Lithuania
and is striving to ﬁnalize similar agreements with all EU Member States.
Hungary has refused to grant 
preferential treatment to 
Moldovan nationals
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Together with Hungary, Poland is among the top countries in Europe 
in terms of issuing visas, an overwhelming number of which also goes 
to the country’s immediate neighbors. While in 2002, 217,000 visas of 
all types were issued by the Polish consulates worldwide, in 2003, the 
ﬁrst year in which the requirement covered the three neighboring CIS
states, the number rose to over 562,000 (out of which over 486,000 
were visas for residence in Poland and 60,000 were transit visas). A year 
later when the new policy towards the eastern neighbors had been in 
force for a full year, the number had further doubled to over 1,233,000 
(out of which only ﬁve percent were for transit). The practice of issuing
visas is in line with the announced policy of facilitating access to Poland 
to all persons interested, except those with a proven criminal record or 
a demonstrable risk of illegal migration. In 2003, a mere one percent of 
applicants were denied Polish visas and a year later the share of refusals 
dropped to around 0.75 percent.16
As in Hungary’s case, the bulk of the rise in the demand for short-
term Polish visas came from its immediate neighbors. In the last 
quarter of 2003, eleven Polish consulates issued nearly 360,000 visas 
to nationals of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, of which half went to 
Ukrainian citizens. This number accounted for around 70 percent of
all the visas granted by Polish consulates worldwide in 2003. In 2004, 
the share of the three nationalities in the number of Polish visas rose 
to over 85 percent, and nearly half of all Polish visas were granted to 
citizens of Ukraine.
16 The number of refusals stood at 5,602 in 2003 and 9,342 in 2004. See Report on the 
Work of the Polish Consular Service in 2003, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Consular and
Polish Diaspora Department: Warsaw 2004, p. 4, and Report on the Work of the Polish 
Consular Service in 2004, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Consular and Polish Diaspora
Department: Warsaw 2005, p. 8.
In 2003, a mere one percent 
of applicants were denied 
Polish visas
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Table 5. 
Number of Polish visas issued to nationals of three CIS states, 
2003–2005
Citizenship 2003 2004 1.01-19.04.2005 Total
Ukraine 184,987   575,471 164,364   924,822
Belarus  99,904   278,441  66,560   444,905
Russia  73,564   204,951  54,831   333,346
Total 358,455 1,058,683 285,755 1,702,893
Source: Polish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs.
The concentration of demand for Polish visas put considerable
strain on the network of 12 consulates in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. 
Seven of those consulates, located in the close vicinity of the Polish 
border (Lviv, Lutsk, Kaliningrad, Brest and Hrodna) or in the capitals 
of its immediate neighbors (Minsk, Belarus; Kyiv, Ukraine), handled 
over 90 percent of the applications.
The only Polish consulate in the Republic of Moldova, in Chisinau,
issued fewer than 45,000 visas between January 2003 and April 2005. 
The Republic of Moldova was not covered by the government’s New
Visa Policy program and visas were introduced for its nationals as 
early as 2001. However, this country, which was previously far below 
the three other European CIS members on the Polish agenda, was 
recognized as the EU’s future neighbor and thus a part of Poland’s vision 
for the eastern dimension of EU foreign policy, formally presented in 
2003.17 In April 2004, through an exchange of diplomatic notes and 
at the initiative of the Moldovan authorities, an asymmetric policy was 
introduced between Poland and the Republic of Moldova. Eﬀective as
of May 28, 2004, in a similar manner to the Polish–Ukrainian policy, 
visa requirements were dropped for Polish nationals, while Polish 
consulates now issue visas to citizens of Moldova free of charge. 
17 Polish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs non-paper on eastern policy, January 2003.
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The preferential arrangements for Moldova were possible due to
a readmission agreement between the two countries which had been 
in force since 1994. Nevertheless a recent trend in illegal border 
crossings by citizens of Moldova resulted in the Republic of Moldova 
being classiﬁed by European border guards, including Polish ones, as
a country with a high risk of illegal migration. Moldovans, as one of 
the nationalities most frequently intercepted either illegally crossing the 
Polish frontier in westward transit or engaged in human traﬃcking,
have thus become an object of particular scrutiny from Polish consular 
and border control services. One of the measures that were introduced 
in late 2004 was the de facto restriction for those nationals to place their 
applications in the consulate in Chisinau, which enjoys the best access 
to operational information on this group of applicants.
2 . 3  L o c a l  B o r d e r  T r a f f i c
As was highlighted above, the bulk of travelers originated from areas in 
the immediate vicinity of the border. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
local cross-border movement was based on bilateral agreements dating 
back to the Communist period. These agreements allowed residents
of border regions to cross the border with a “travel voucher” without 
a passport or visa for a maximum stay of 10 days. Those policies were
appreciated in the early 1990s as shuttle traders could avoid paying a 
relatively high price for the passport (compared to the prevailing wage 
levels) by opting for the use of the simpliﬁed border crossing passes
instead. In the course of accession negotiations, the EU required 
candidates to terminate those local border policies with their neighbors 
as they violated the Schengen acquis. The candidates argued that the
requirement to terminate these agreements for this reason demonstrated 
the EU’s double standards, tolerating local border traﬃc within the EU
and in some cases on the external EU frontier. The agreement between
Italy and Serbia and Montenegro illustrates how an EU member may 
maintain this policy with a country on the EU black visa list. 
Moldova classiﬁed as a country
with a high risk of illegal 
migration
The EU’s double standards
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Although the Hungarian and Polish strategies for visa policies with 
their immediate neighbors were in many respects very similar, the two 
countries adopted diﬀerent approaches to the issue of maintaining local
border policies. Hungary pressed on with this issue, while Poland chose 
to keep a low proﬁle in this regard. The original Hungarian negotiating
position in the JHA chapter expressed the intention to keep these 
agreements in place until internal borders are removed.18 As the Union 
threatened that maintaining those agreements would be considered 
a derogation, Hungary terminated the agreement with Ukraine as of 
August 1, 2003. As a consequence of this move, the legal movement 
of Ukrainian nationals into Hungary dropped by 40,000 entries or 
14 percent between July and September the same year.19 Nonetheless, 
despite the discontinuation of the local border traﬃc policy, the amount
of cross-border movement has not considerably declined in the area in 
the long run. This was possible as the two former small border crossing-
points, which have since received international status, seem to primarily 
serve the needs of the local population of the border region. 
In contrast, there was much less emphasis in the Polish pre-
accession strategy on simpliﬁed border traﬃc procedures with its
eastern neighbors, as the discontinuation of the simpliﬁed policy in
2003 was not followed by any bilateral arrangements. In the words of 
one respondent, Poland did not want to press for additional concessions 
considering the Commission’s tolerance of the liberal visa arrangement 
with Ukraine. Poland is, along with other Visegrad states (especially 
Hungary and Slovakia), interested in the quick entry into force of the 
Draft Council Regulation on local border traﬃc.
18 Negotiating Position of the Government of the Republic of Hungary on Chapter 24, 
1999.
19 Down from 278,000 in July to 233,000 in September, Central Statistical Oﬃce,
January 2004.
  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  —  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  S E R I E S
42
3 .  V I S A  P R O C E D U R E S  O N  T H E  G R O U N D
The review of the consular and visa policies presented in the ﬁrst three
sections of the report is based on an analysis of national documents, 
statistics and interviews with civil servants at central ministries. The
focus has therefore so far been on the formation of national strategies 
in the course of accession negotiations in the area of Justice and Home 
Aﬀairs. This section, based on ﬁeld research in Ukraine and Moldova,
considers and contrasts the experience of consular staﬀ with that of the
applicants on the ground. 
3 . 1  P r a c t i c e s  R e v i e w e d  b y  C o n s u l a r  S t a f f
The consuls of the Visegrad states receiving applications from the citizens
of Ukraine and Moldova were asked to reﬂect on their experiences in
implementing the new visa policies, that is, the general direction and 
objectives of the policy and its reception by the host countries. The
results reveal that at times there are non negligible diﬀerences among
the four countries’ practices and in the way visa issues are viewed by 
consular staﬀ on the ground and the central visa administration in the
given country’s capital.
For instance, while security considerations were the overriding 
concern for the Czech and Slovak national policies, the consuls of the 
two countries place emphasis on a willingness to liberalize visa measures. 
Their views take into account not only the clear guidelines laid down in
the legislation, but also the local conditions in the countries of origin. 
For example, the two states note that Ukraine is the future neighbor 
of the Schengen area and, along with Moldova, a source of signiﬁcant
migration. Czech and Slovak consular staﬀ recognize the negative
eﬀects of the current restrictive travel policy for Moldovans and stress
that they facilitate travel conditions in well-founded cases (e.g. through 
waivers of the deposit). 
Security considerations 
were the overriding concern 
for Czech and Slovak 
national policies
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In contrast, the Hungarian consular staﬀ consider the visa
requirements for Ukraine as merely administrative barriers to entry that 
do not serve as a security ﬁlter. Moreover, they consider Hungary’s visa
policy for Ukraine to be the most liberal among the V4, which goes 
beyond the Polish model in that it grants visa exemptions not only 
to holders of diplomatic but also service passports (which covers, for 
example, members of government, civil servants and military oﬃcials).
According to consuls, Ukrainian authorities and the public reacted 
positively to the preferential measures oﬀered by Hungary. However,
in light of a prospective cutback in staﬀ numbers following a January
2005 review by the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Aﬀairs, the consuls believed that charging some (low level) visa fees
would have made economic sense. Inexpensive (but not free) visas 
would also facilitate transition to the period after Hungary’s Schengen 
accession, when visa fees will have to be introduced.
Similarly to their Hungarian colleagues, the Polish consuls 
considered their own government’s visa policies as the most liberal 
among the Visegrad states. This liberal character is reinforced by a
unique system of consular independence. Polish consuls have the 
power to make the ﬁnal decision on issuing visas, which highlights
the role of practical experience in limiting the number of visas issued 
improperly. However, the oﬃcials unanimously call for online access to
Border Guard and police databases to limit the number of cases when 
visas are cancelled by the border guards. Respondents also reported a 
perception that Polish consuls were under some pressure from their 
counterparts from Schengen and other Visegrad States to bring the 
number of refusals closer to the “EU average.” Polish policy in Moldova 
has also been seen as an eﬀort to remain open, yet clearly the country
was perceived in a diﬀerent light than Ukraine. Visas for Moldovan
citizens were introduced in 2001 and the consulate in Chisinau was 
not subject to preparations for an expected increase in the number of 
visa applications. 
Administrative barriers to entry
Moldova perceived in a 
different light than Ukraine
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Moldova seems to have been a lower priority for Hungary too. 
Although the low refusal rate (the number of rejected applications 
was less than one percent) was well received in the country, technical 
preparations for the introduction of visas in Chisinau were judged 
insuﬃcient. Visa traﬃc after the introduction of the new policy was 
much greater than expected and the available infrastructure (e.g. the 
size of the customer service area) and staﬀ proved to be insuﬃcient for
operating the system properly. Initially visas often had not been issued 
by the deadline, there were long lines in front of the consulate and the 
press repeatedly criticized the embassy’s way of handling the process. 
Accordingly, the reactions of the government and the public have been 
negative. Visa issuance originally took place on embassy premises, and 
the new computerized customer service building was only completed 
in October 2002. 
In addition to their general impressions about the new visa regimes, 
the consuls also discussed several speciﬁc aspects of the visa-issuing
services: 
• Online services. Among the Polish consular staﬀ, there is no
agreement on the usefulness of the option of making Internet 
applications available. In Kyiv, the consulate’s website provides 
information and the application may be printed out. However, this 
form is not considered to be either popular (likely due to limited 
Internet access) or particularly useful. In Lviv, the main online 
service provided is pre-registration, through which 20 percent of 
the daily quota of queuing coupons is distributed—mainly among 
preferred groups of travelers such as academics, or business owners. 
The websites of the Hungarian consulates in Ukraine provide all the 
necessary information concerning the visa application procedure 
as well as the application form which, however, cannot be ﬁlled
out and submitted online. It is also not possible to pre-register for 
an appointment online. Czech and Slovak application forms are 
not available online (with the exception of the Slovak Uzhhorod 
consulate). The Czech procedures in fact do not provide the option
Infrastructure and staff 
proved to be insufﬁcient for
operating the system
Czech and Slovak application 
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to access the visa application procedure via the Internet or by e-mail. 
Despite the enthusiasm of Slovak consuls for online applications, 
the issue is under the competence of the Consular Department 
of the Foreign Ministry. Such a move would require updating the 
Consulate’s technical equipment, since most of the work is done 
manually (including lengthy and demanding manual searches in 
the archive of old applications). 
• Collective applications. The consulates of all four countries have
established practices of working with “accredited” or “reliable” travel 
agencies submitting applications on behalf of groups of applicants. 
Collective applications are seen as useful mainly because they save 
time for staﬀ (who do not need to check whether applications are
ﬁlled out correctly as this is done by agencies) and applicants (who
do not have to appear in person). The list of such reliable agencies
are carefully maintained and periodically reviewed, and agencies 
that provide falsiﬁed documents or lodge otherwise unsubstantiated
applications lose their status. Procedures vary somewhat from 
country to country. Some consulates for instance perform random 
checks on applications, while others do not consider this necessary. 
Similarly, some consulates reserve certain days for processing 
collective applications only. Less common but ostensibly an option 
(e.g. at Polish, Hungarian or Slovak consulates) is the practice of 
individual applications on behalf of another person. In such cases 
the person submitting the application has to attach a notarized 
power of attorney. 
• Data processing. In Hungarian consulates, the applicant’s data and 
photo are entered into the Consular Information System, which is 
linked to the Police and Border Guard databases. Thus, unwanted
applicants can be immediately refused. Similarly, in Slovak 
consulates, after an application is submitted, several databases are 
searched, starting with a database of undesirable persons. In the 
event of suspicion about a particular applicant, a manual search 
in the consulate’s archive of old applications is performed because 
“Accredited” or “reliable”  
travel agencies
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names can be legally changed. The Polish practice similarly consists 
of screening the applicant’s passport and consulting the database 
of undesirable aliens, managed by the Polish Immigration Oﬃce.
However, Polish consuls—unlike their counterparts from Schengen 
(and to some extent, other Visegrad) states—do not have access 
to police records, which would help them screen out persons who 
have committed a crime in Poland. As a result, cases have been 
recorded of Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens with valid Polish visas 
being turned away at the border by the Polish border guards on the 
grounds of their earlier criminal record or deportation. One of the 
short-term remedies could be a relevant addition to the Polish visa 
application form. 
• Consular investigation and interview. The more liberal procedures
adopted by Hungary and Poland, in which large numbers of visas 
are issued daily, assume that most applications are handled in a 
standard way without the requirement of consular investigation. 
The Hungarian procedure followed in both Ukraine and Moldova 
does not necessarily require all individual applicants to be 
interviewed by a consul. In the case of Poland, an interview with 
the applicant in Ukraine takes place only if questions persist on the 
purpose of travel, history of visas issued (and especially refused) or 
the additional documents attached. Moldovan travelers are checked 
more strictly, and are also required to show proof of accommodation 
in Poland. Discretion is granted to consuls in Slovakia as well, and 
special attention is paid when considering applications from the 
so-called “risk group”—mainly the unemployed and people with 
low incomes or without stable income. Consuls are, in suspicious 
cases, allowed to turn down an applicant even if the Ministry of the 
Interior agrees with issuing the visa. The consul may also specify
a particular border crossing which must be used by the applicant 
when traveling to Slovakia. On the other hand, the consul may 
also waive some requirements. At the other end of the scale is the 
Czech procedure which requires each applicant to submit his/her 
Polish consuls do not have 
access to police records
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application personally at the consulate and where each applicant is 
potentially subject to an interview. 
3 . 2  P r o b l e m  A r e a s  I d e n t i f i e d  b y  C o n s u l a r  S t a f f
The consuls of Visegrad states have pointed out the following problems
in the current procedures: 
• Multiple passports in Ukraine. The fact that Ukrainian citizens may 
have more than one passport, sometimes containing diﬀerent
versions of their personal data, poses a challenge to the existing 
database systems. The consuls agree that the databases of un-
desirables should contain applicants’ photographs (currently not 
available). The multiplicity of passports makes the decision to issue
a visa more diﬃcult as an applicant may supply a new passport
if his or her old one contained a mark conﬁrming that a visa
had been refused before. The practice is in most cases a result of
corruption or lack of electronic evidence at the territorial oﬃces
of citizen registration and passports. The key problem is the lack
of a unique ID number for all Ukrainian citizens, which would be 
associated with each individual. The taxpayer’s ID, used currently,
is far from universal and cases of more than one ID per person have 
been noted. Apart from the lack of a single system for keeping a 
record of citizens, the consuls mentioned diﬃculties in obtaining
the necessary information on Ukrainian citizens both at home 
(the Interior Ministry and the Police) and abroad (the Ukrainian 
consulates in Poland). 
• Local infrastructure. The Czech consuls concur that to resolve
a number of problems related to the conditions of issuing visas, 
collaboration with the Ukrainian authorities is essential. Since the 
jurisdiction of the consulate does not extend beyond its premises, 
there is no formal possibility to regulate activities outside the 
building, which may involve paid “services” promising to expedite 
Key problem is the lack of 
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the procedure. Due to the occurrence of illegal or undesirable 
practices outside the consulate premises (self-organization of 
unoﬃcial waiting lists), the practice of telephone appointments has
been established. The Slovak consulate in Uzhhorod plans to use
a system of railings and turnstiles in order to minimize conﬂicts
and better manage the lines. Telephone registration, similar to the 
online registration used by the Polish Consulate in Lviv, began in 
August, but a new building which would meet all Schengen criteria 
appears essential (following the example of the local Hungarian 
consulate).
3 . 3  V i s a  P r o c e d u r e s  a s  S e e n  b y  A p p l i c a n t s
To present a picture as seen from the applicants’ point of view, 
independent researchers from Ukraine and Moldova tested procedures 
at three consulates of each Visegrad state in various locations (in Kyiv, 
Lviv, Uzhhorod, Chisinau and Bucharest) by submitting applications 
themselves. However, given the limited number of on-site visits, the 
results should not be regarded as a detailed evaluation of any particular 
consulate, but merely as indications of general trends in national 
approaches to visa issuing. This reﬂects the fact that ﬁrstly, consular
networks do not overlap. The Visegrad states are represented in
diﬀerent locations in Western Ukraine (Lviv or Uzhhorod) and serving
Moldovan applicants either from Chisinau (Poland and Hungary) or 
Bucharest (Czech Republic and Slovakia). Secondly, conditions vary 
by locality both in terms of the consular infrastructure and the pool of 
applicants (with the actual level of demand varying widely, from several 
dozen to over a thousand applicants daily). Both of these factors limit 
possibilities for direct comparisons.
Evaluation of the procedure takes into account the whole application 
process from an initial inquiry to the ﬁrst interview (where applicable)
and receipt of the visa. Researchers were asked not only to note the 
Unofﬁcial waiting lists
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formal requirements and the organization of visa-issuing procedures 
but also to reﬂect on the staﬀ’s attitudes, with particular attention to
service-orientation and non-discrimination. 
3 . 4  A c c e s s i n g  I n f o r m a t i o n  
  a n d  P r e p a r i n g  a n  A p p l i c a t i o n
In order to ensure an open procedure, access to information that would 
assist the potential applicant in assessing the duration, complexity and 
total cost of obtaining a visa is needed prior to a visit at a consulate. 
Learning the details of the procedure from generally available sources is 
especially important for applicants who live far away from the location 
of the consular oﬃce. Cases of unnecessary visits to consulates may
be further eliminated if persons can assess their own chances of being 
granted visas. Relatively simple application forms that are easy to ﬁll
out on the basis of information provided also reduce waiting time for 
applicants and staﬀ time invested by the consulates themselves.
First, opportunities for learning the details of the procedure over 
the phone were tested. All the consulates under investigation have 
dedicated phone numbers where applicants can receive information on 
the process. However, not all the numbers are equally well advertised in 
the various media. Major problems persist in cases where the consulate 
is located in another country (as with the Czech and Slovak consulates 
for Moldova), requiring applicants to search the internet or call the 
telephone information line abroad, in the consulate’s location in 
Bucharest, Romania. A key issue is that only a few consulates oﬀer
automated information services outside oﬃce hours (roughly from
9am to 4pm on weekdays), but in many cases the oﬃce hours are not
advertised. Once the appropriate number is obtained, however, callers 
can generally reach the service without too much waiting as lines are not 
too busy. Information is generally available in the national languages 
of the consular locations (Ukrainian and Romanian) and some 
Access to information
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information is also provided in Russian. With the exception of two 
locations, the person receiving calls was local, but in one location the 
staﬀ member answering the call did not know the oﬃcial language of 
the country. Generally, the researchers found the information provided 
to be comprehensive (including the step-by-step application procedure 
and oﬃce hours of the consulate), although the researchers have also
encountered cases when staﬀ did not answer the phone or questions
were answered in an abrupt manner. 
An alternative source of information for travelers is (or would be) the 
representation’s website or other online resource. However, a number 
of the Visegrad consulates have no website (e.g. the Polish consulate in 
Chisinau and none of the Slovak consulates in the two countries). No 
e-versions of the Polish applications are available in Chisinau and Czech 
application forms are not available electronically either in Lviv or in 
Bucharest. The Hungarian consulate in Kyiv serves as a positive example
as its website contains all the necessary information, including oﬃce
hours, a full list of application documents, and a phone number that 
may be used in case of emergency, and the Polish sites in Kyiv and Lviv 
were also found to be easy to use and quite comprehensive. The websites
of the Polish consulates in Kyiv and Lviv and the Hungarian consulate 
in Kyiv also make the necessary forms available for downloading and 
printing out, and instructions in Ukrainian are available. In the Polish 
consulate in Lviv it is also possible for persons, travel agencies and 
other institutions to register an application online, in which case the 
conﬁrmation given also indicates the time for a visit to the consulate,
thereby allowing the applicant to skip one stage in the procedure. 
The complexity of the application forms represents a potential barrier
to successful completion of the process, and it also creates a market for 
the services of intermediaries. These range from individuals oﬀering to
ﬁll out the application form on the spot for a fee to specialized travel
agencies that have the forms available, collect the required attachments 
and submit the applications on behalf of individuals. This issue is most
pertinent in those procedures where mistakes while ﬁlling out the form
A number of the Visegrad 
consulates have no website
Complexity of the application 
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may be grounds for refusing a visa and little assistance is oﬀered to
applicants, as in the Czech case. The researchers found the instructions
for the application forms that are provided on the consulates’ boards to 
be unintelligible. While the content of the application forms is nearly 
identical (they all contain 48 questions), their layout, language versions 
and instruction forms vary. All the forms are printed in very small 
font, which is diﬃcult to read. Strongest criticism was expressed about
the Czech form, which as a standard in both Ukraine and Moldova is 
worded in Czech, English, German and Russian only, with no versions 
in the national languages of the two states. 
3 . 5  S u b m i t t i n g  t h e  A p p l i c a t i o n
The next stage of the investigation sought to pinpoint potential and
existing barriers to submitting the application during the applicant’s 
visit to the consulate. Although the frequency and duration of periods 
in which applications are accepted varies from one consulate to another, 
reﬂecting the demand for visas in diﬀerent locations, the real issue is
the manner in which the oﬃcial schedule is interpreted. Nearly all
the consulates open their doors on time, but several ﬁnish accepting
applications after only two to three hours, which in some cases results 
in a number of applicants not being served that day. The researchers
concluded that the schedule of accepting documents was interpreted 
in favor of the applicants in the Polish consulate in Chisinau, the 
Hungarian consulates in Kyiv and Uzhhorod, while the manner in 
which applications were received at the Czech and Slovak consulates 
was bureaucratic.
The time spent in line from picking up the form to submission
of documents varied from 30–40 minutes (the Czech, Hungarian 
and Slovak consulates in Kyiv) to one hour (the Hungarian and 
Polish consulates in Chisinau and the Czech and Slovak consulates in 
Bucharest). In the most extreme cases, the waiting time was as much 
The real issue is the manner  
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as two and a half to three hours at the Polish consulate in Kyiv and the 
Czech consulate in Lviv. While interruptions in service were usually 
not extensive, it was noted that in some cases the applicants forming a 
line in front of a window were left waiting without the clerk giving any 
estimate of how long they would have to wait and were not directed to 
other windows. On the positive side, the ﬂow of people was generally
eﬃciently managed, and thus waiting time was not prolonged by
confusion or duplication of lines. In cases of very high demand, pre-
booking systems were also used. 
Physical waiting conditions were variable, but in some cases left 
a lot to be desired. Customer service rooms can rarely accommodate 
a large number of applicants and as most procedures allow for only 
a few persons to stay inside at any given time, the majority needs to 
wait outside. Unfortunately, even in locations where long lines form, 
there tend to be no chairs or benches to sit on, no roof to protect 
against the sun, wind or rain, no bathroom and no facilities for people 
with disabilities. In several consulates, few or no chairs are available in 
the customer service room, and whether individuals in need (pregnant 
women or the elderly) get a seat is left to the courtesy of other waiting 
applicants. 
The cost of placing an application is currently not an issue with
regard to tourist visas for Ukrainian citizens. Nonetheless, room for 
improvement has been identiﬁed with regard to the cases where fees
are still charged. In the case of Moldovan nationals where no visa fee 
exemptions apply (except for Poland), the Czech, Hungarian and 
Slovak consulates charge non-refundable fees prior to submitting the 
application. Moreover, procedures determining the form of payment 
are very meticulous—for instance, one Czech consulate accepts only 
certain types of US dollar bills, while payment for Hungarian visa 
applications needs to be made at a bank in euros, requiring in both 
cases exchanging the local currency.
Waiting time was as much as 
two and a half to three hours
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3 . 6  E v a l u a t i o n  o f  C o n s u l a r  S e r v i c e s  
  b y  T r a v e l  A g e n c i e s
Apart from being evaluated by their own staﬀ and independent
researchers, the operation of the consulates of the Visegrad states in 
Ukraine and Moldova was the object of an inquiry, conducted among 
a total of 19 tourist agencies which cooperate on a regular basis with 
the respective consulates. A relative geographical balance was sought as, 
on average, three agencies in each of the six locations (Lviv, Uzhhorod, 
Kyiv, Odessa, Balti and Chisinau) were contacted. The sample drew on
the lists of “authorized” agencies, obtained from some of the consulates 
and from advertisements in the local press. 
The agencies were asked to specify how they cooperate with the
consulates, and to deﬁne the main problems while receiving visas for
Visegrad countries. The very fact that individual applicants resort to
the services of specialized agencies to manage their application process 
indicates a certain complexity of existing procedures. Nearly all the 
agencies are engaged in ﬁlling out applications, supplying information
on the required additional documents, arranging hotel reservations in 
the countries of destination and providing other types of documents 
(health insurance certiﬁcates or cost-of-living vouchers). In addition,
institutional invitations are procured for applicants to the Polish 
consulates in Kyiv, Odessa and Chisinau, and on a smaller scale to 
the Czech consulate in Kyiv and the Hungarian consulate in Chisinau. 
Personal invitations are only arranged by a small number of agencies 
(most notably for applicants to the Polish consulate in Kyiv). 
Table 6 contains averages of the mean scores that the representatives 
of agencies in the three regions (central and southern Ukraine, western 
Ukraine and Moldova) assigned to various aspects of their relationships 
with the consulates of Visegrad states. Although in the majority of cases 
the agencies expressed satisfaction (the high scores of 4 and 5), there 
is clearly room for improvement, particularly concerning the speed 
of processing the applications, willingness to explain the basis for the 
There is clearly room for 
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decision and a respectful attitude towards the applicant. It should also 
be noted that, as fewer of the agencies dealt with the Slovak consulates, 
the results for this country may be less reliable than for the other 
three. 
Table 6. 
Satisfaction with cooperation between the consulates of Visegrad 
countries and travel agencies in Ukraine and Moldova*
Criteria Czech 
Republic
Hungary Poland Slovakia
Predictable and clear procedure 4 4.3 5 4.3
Speed of handling the 
applications
3.3 3.7 4,7 4
Willingness to provide 
information upon request
3.5 4 4.7 4.3
Adherence to rules (as opposed 
to arbitrary decisions)
3.7 4.3 5 4.3
Willingness to explain the basis 
for the decision
2.7 3 4 3.3
Respectful attitude towards the 
applicant
3 4 4.8 3.7
* On a scale of 1–5 where 1 stands for complete dissatisfaction and 5 full satis-
faction.
In central and southern Ukraine, three tourist agencies in Odessa and 
three tourist agencies in Kyiv were asked questions about various issues 
regarding their cooperation with all Visegrad consulates. Odessa tourist 
agencies deal directly with the local Polish consulate and cooperate 
with tourist agencies in Kyiv which play an intermediary role in the 
contact between the other three consulates and Odessa tourist agencies. 
The majority of the agencies are rather experienced and have been able
to develop their own approaches to problems. None of them were able 
to point out any concrete diﬃculties or problems in working with
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the Visegrad consulates: for instance, no complaints were expressed 
about the work procedures, which were considered to be relatively 
clear. Generally, the representatives of tourist agencies believe that the 
probability of the application being rejected depends to a large extent 
on each agency’s credibility.
In western Ukraine, six tourist agencies (three in Lviv and three 
in Uzhhorod) were contacted. All Lviv agencies deal with the Polish 
Consulate in Lviv, while most prefer to deal with the Kyiv consulates of 
the other Visegrad countries as they complain about the poor standards 
of work at their Lviv and Uzhhorod consulates. In particular, criticism 
was raised about the disrespectful attitude towards the applicants and 
the amount of time spent processing documents at the Czech and 
Slovak consulates in Lviv. Similarly, Uzhhorod tourist agencies deal 
directly with the local Hungarian consulate and cooperate with tourist 
agencies in Kyiv which play an intermediary role in interaction between 
the other three consulates and Uzhhorod tourist agencies. 
Practically all the representatives of the agencies emphasized that, 
while canceling or lowering the consular fees was important, changing 
the attitude towards Ukrainian citizens was a key problem that needed 
to be addressed. Applicants from the western region of Ukraine have 
experienced biased and disrespectful attitudes on the part of the 
consular staﬀ. The absence of proper facilities in waiting rooms and
the persistent problem of long lines in front of the consulate buildings 
are also perceived as signs of disrespect towards Ukrainian citizens. The
agencies realize that it is administrative diﬃculties, resulting in long
lines and frequently requirements for additional documents, that make 
many people resort to their services to obtain visas. 
In Moldova, seven agencies were interviewed—all of them in 
the capital city Chisinau and one in the northern town of Balti (the 
Transnistrian region could not be reached). All of them work with the 
Polish consulate in Chisinau, three out of seven with the Hungarian and 
Czech consulates and only one with the Slovak consulate. Most of the 
travel agencies interviewed forecast a steady demand for their services, 
No complaints were expressed 
about the work procedures
Changing the attitude  
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but also pointed to the market potential which remains unexplored 
because of the complexity of procedures. With regard to Slovakia, 
diﬃculties in obtaining the national visa was observed in particular as
the reason for large demand not being met.
In general the Moldovan travel agencies are not particularly satisﬁed
with the consulates. The most positive attitude is towards the Polish
consulate, which has a very open policy towards the travel agencies 
accredited with the consulate, organizes regular meetings and notiﬁes
the travel agencies well in advance about changes in procedure. Due to 
the facilitation of visa issuing processes Poland became one of the most 
important tourist destinations and deﬁnitely the most important as far
as business tourism is concerned. In contrast, the agencies underlined 
that the overly demanding requirements of the other Visegrad consulates 
depressed the level of interest in travel to the respective states. Potential 
tourists were said to be changing their destination and prefer places 
with less hassle in obtaining the visa. Some agencies interviewed 
pointed out the discriminatory procedure for the citizens of Moldova. 
The “Moldovan passport” is treated with suspicion, and the applicants
are treated as criminals and “second class citizens.” Others pointed 
out that the personnel at the consulates (especially the Hungarian 
representation) were very rude and unprofessional, displaying a general 
lack of respect for the applicants, in the case of both individuals and 
travel agencies. 
The Moldovan agencies suggested a number of measures that ought
to be taken by the consulates to solve these problems. It was stated that 
the consulates should appreciate and work with more conﬁdence with
the travel agencies that have been proved to be reliable. One agency 
suggested that the consulates change their personnel and that training 
in customer relations be required for future clerks. Finally, it was felt 
that the consulates should work towards simplifying procedures and 
be more prompt in informing the accredited travel agencies about any 
upcoming changes.
The “Moldovan passport” 
is treated with suspicion
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4 .  V I S E G R A D  C O O P E R AT I O N  E X P E R I E N C E
The second part of the report goes beyond the experiences of individual
countries in the political and technical aspects of visa and consular 
policies, seeking lessons for the possible cooperation or clash of interests 
among the Visegrad states. This section relies primarily on interviews
with oﬃcials, investigating possible political action and inﬂuence on 
EU policy in the area of facilitating visa policy as regards citizens of 
Ukraine and Moldova for travel into the countries of the Visegrad 
Group. Seeking to identify potential areas for future joint endeavors, 
the paper brieﬂy reviews opportunities for V4 cooperation since
EU accession and current practices of collaboration among the four 
countries in Ukraine and Moldova. 
4 . 1  I n c e n t i v e s  f o r  V i s e g r a d  C o o p e r a t i o n  
  a f t e r  E U  A c c e s s i o n
The experience of negotiating EU accession with the European
Commission left the Visegrad Group as a forum for cooperation among 
the four East Central European states considerably weakened. In essence, 
the bilateral nature of the negotiations, lack of clarity about the extent 
of obligations and the conditionality of EU accession led to a situation 
in which notions of cooperation and coordination among candidate 
states were aﬃrmed verbally but where, in practice, the V4 countries’
relations were characterized by competition. The race for membership
was reinforced by the Commission’s practice of “disciplining” those 
states that lagged behind other candidates through regular status reports 
on the preparation of applicant countries. The EU repeatedly pointed
out that strengthening the future external borders and introducing visa 
requirements towards non-EU neighbors was considered as evidence 
of the candidates’ commitment to, and preparedness for, accession, 
further increasing pressure on oﬃcials working in the four capitals on
JHA-related policy areas.
The V4 countries’ relations were 
characterized by competition
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However, following EU accession, opportunities for cooperation 
were reinforced in a number of policy areas, including visa issues. Firstly, 
these countries have changed from being recipients of EU policies to 
co-initiators by gaining access to the Union’s inner decision-making 
processes. The mode of policymaking in the EU relies on consensus
seeking and coalition building, which, in principle, is equally likely 
to rely on temporary, interest-based coalitions than on formalized 
permanent groupings like the Visegrad Group. However, the Visegrad 
countries share speciﬁc interests and aspirations that determine their
perspectives within the Union that could serve as a basis for articulating 
a common agenda. An expression of this recognition is that in May 
2004, the prime ministers of the four countries accepted a new Visegrad 
declaration expressing their determination to continue developing 
cooperation. This cooperation among the four new Member States
would focus on their contribution to the development and shaping of 
EU policies towards Eastern and Southeastern European countries, and 
in particular the European Neighborhood Policy. 
Another area of shared interest is in the four countries’ entering 
the Schengen system simultaneously. In a common declaration on 
September 11, 2003 at a meeting of Visegrad interior ministers, the 
participants committed to joint preparation and harmonized steps 
towards membership in the Schengen zone. As a result, diﬀerent expert-
level working groups (the Schengen cooperation working group, the 
SIS-2 working group and a network of lawyers) were set up to help 
harmonize the Schengen action plans of the four countries, and the 
four applications for Schengen entry were submitted jointly at the end 
of 2004. Furthermore, Poland’s proposal that all four countries undergo 
assessment of their border-control systems simultaneously so that they 
would join Schengen fully in 2007 was accepted. The countries were
also able to agree on a common application for the screening exercise, 
as well as expressing in the Czech-Polish case the political resolve to seek 
common entry and be thus perceived as a single unit for the purposes 
of this policy. 
Following EU accession, 
opportunities for cooperation 
were reinforced
Applications for Schengen 
entry were submitted jointly
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In terms of visa policy, it is important to note an initiative by 
the Minister of the Interior of Hungary at the Salzburg Forum of 
November 12, 2004 which included Austria and Slovenia as well as the 
Visegrad countries. Initially closer cooperation in sharing consulates 
for visa purposes was envisioned between Austria and Hungary, while 
remaining open to the other participants of the Salzburg Forum. 
Detailed conditions for further cooperation are to be worked out by 
ministries of foreign aﬀairs and it remains unclear whether it would be
limited to sharing admission of applications or would also extend to 
issuing visas on each other’s behalf. Although consultations about visa 
and Schengen policy are being held at the Forum, they currently seem 
to have signiﬁcantly slowed down due to diﬀerences between countries
fully participating in the Schengen system and countries which are only 
partially involved. The Salzburg initiative has also been criticized as a
possible source of competition to the Visegrad framework, creating a 
certain amount of redundancy in terms of structures. 
4 . 2  F i e l d  C o o p e r a t i o n  a m o n g  t h e  
  V 4  C o n s u l a t e s  i n  U k r a i n e  a n d  M o l d o v a
Currently cooperation is quite modest among the V4 in consular aﬀairs
in Ukraine and Moldova. The Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak
consuls in the two countries noted that the fact that individual countries 
were facing diﬀerent problems limited cooperation in strategic/political
matters. However, this did not prevent some collaboration at a technical 
and operational level, primarily consisting of exchange of information 
and ad hoc consultations.
As the Czech consuls pointed out, the Czech Republic stands apart 
from the other V4 countries in that it does not share a border with 
Ukraine or Moldova, and consequently had only marginal interest 
in cooperation on border management. From the Czech perspective, 
the issue of short-term visas has been strongly connected with illegal 
Some collaboration at a 
technical and operational level
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employment, as tourist visas were frequently used (and abused) 
by Ukrainians by overstaying the permitted period and taking up 
employment. Ukrainian citizens have dominated the statistics of 
foreigners violating the residence/stay policy in the Czech Republic, 
thus liberalized entry regulations were not envisaged. Some of these 
sentiments were echoed by Slovak oﬃcials. They underlined that visa
policy is determined by the sovereign political decisions of respective 
states, and that this policy area should be treated as a purely internal 
issue. For that reason, oﬃcials interviewed were rather skeptical about
the likelihood of future joint Visegrad action in favor of more ﬂexible
entry conditions for non-EU neighbors.
The Hungarian, Polish and Slovak consuls agreed that the main
positive function of V4 meetings in the pre-accession period was the 
exchange of information about the respective states’ visa policy models. 
A good example was the lessons that the Hungarian consuls learned 
from the experiences of the other states as they were preparing to launch 
their own visa system for Ukraine. The Visegrad consuls in Kyiv agreed
that EU accession fundamentally altered the scope of V4 cooperation 
among their consulates in that location. Regular meetings on visa and 
consular issues for just the four states were considered to be of some 
use before EU accession. For instance, representatives from candidate 
countries posted to Kyiv met on a regular basis before the introduction 
of visa requirements. In the current, post-EU accession but pre-
Schengen enlargement phase, regular meetings in a broader forum (EU 
and Schengen) have taken on additional signiﬁcance which the separate
cooperation of new members (including the Visegrad Group) cannot 
match. These meetings are useful as tools of information exchange
as well as of the harmonization of visa requirements (e.g. required 
documentation, required means of ﬁnancial subsistence) necessary for
full integration into the Schengen system.
In contrast to doubts as to the usefulness of continued high-
level Visegrad consultation on visa and consular policies, operational 
collaboration (especially information exchange) remains an essential 
Ofﬁcials skeptical about 
the likelihood of future 
joint Visegrad action
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part of day-to-day work. Consuls, especially those with long experience 
in the area, make their decisions by occasionally asking for the “good 
services” of their colleagues from the consulates of the Schengen 
states or Visegrad countries. The need for cooperation is particularly
strong in those locations where only some consulates are represented. 
In Uzhhorod, where among the V4 states only Hungary and (since 
2000) Slovakia have consulates, relations between the two consular 
oﬃces were quickly established. Operational cooperation appears to
be of particular importance with regard to Moldovan nationals who 
apply to the Visegrad consulates in Chisinau and Bucharest. The
geographical distance between the Czech and Slovak consulates on 
the one hand and the Hungarian and Polish ones on the other, and 
the common perception of a relatively high risk of illegal migration 
and transnational crime in this case, represent important incentives for 
exchanging information between the consulates. In 2004, the idea of 
shared Hungarian–Czech oﬃces in Moldova (where the Czech Republic
is currently not represented) and Belarus (where Hungary is currently 
not represented) was raised, but not realized, primarily due to logistical 
problems. 
5 .  E V A L U AT I O N  O F  T H E  N E E D  
 F O R  F U R T H E R  C O O P E R AT I O N
5 . 1  T h e  S c o p e  o f  V i s e g r a d  C o o p e r a t i o n  
  i n  V i s a  A f f a i r s
As shown above, simultaneous, quick integration into Schengen 
represents an axis around which the collaborative eﬀorts of the
ministries of the interior and border guards of the Visegrad states have 
developed. The majority of oﬃcials from those institutions interviewed
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stressed that any national or multilateral scheme for cooperation in 
the JHA area should under no circumstances derail or slow progress 
towards Schengen accession. In particular, the idea of enhancing 
consular cooperation among the V4 states for residents of Ukraine and 
Moldova was received with great reservations or complete rejection 
by the Czech and Slovak oﬃcials interviewed. They noted that their
countries adopted an EU-driven approach to foreign policy, giving 
precedence to deepening integration over maintaining special relations 
with non-EU countries.20 This approach was considered to have been
vindicated by the abolishment of visa requirements by Ukraine for all 
EU states, whether or not former “preferential” or “special” relations 
existed between a given EU country and Ukraine. 
The Czech approach was wary in the pre-accession period of V4
cooperation to the extent that it might interfere with the top priority 
of EU membership. Although this anxiety has lessened, the prevailing 
consensus is that the importance of the Visegrad collaboration should 
not be overestimated. Oﬃcials made it clear that in the event of a conﬂict
between full integration into the Schengen system and V4 cooperation 
in visa policy, the Czech Republic would give priority to the former. In 
fact, concerns have been raised that, at times, the Visegrad forum could 
be used by some states—notably Poland—for pushing their national 
agendas. This turned into a problem as the Czech Republic needed to
ﬁnd a “diplomatic niche,” other than Ukraine, for itself, as relations
with that country were perceived to be virtually monopolized by Polish 
diplomacy. 
Moreover, the absence of an external border makes the Czech 
Republic the least preoccupied of the V4 with relations with the EU’s 
new neighbors. The only potential concern might be border policy with
Slovakia, which is expected to be resolved by simultaneous Schengen 
accession. The legal and political priority of the EU regulatory
20 D. Kral, “Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and
Candidate Countries,” Europeum, Prague, 2005.
Ukraine virtually monopolized 
by Polish diplomacy
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framework also implies that Czech oﬃcials perceive EU institutions as
most eﬀective for future negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and
expect that a new visa policy for the two countries will be primarily 
the result of EU deliberations. Nonetheless, while the EU’s eastern 
neighborhood is not considered to be an issue of vital national interest, 
Czech policy does not exclude the possibility of joining other EU states 
in initiatives to boost foreign policy in this direction. 
While Slovakia is likely to stress the need for Visegrad cooperation 
and could take a more proactive stance regarding EU-Ukraine relations, 
its policy position has in many respects been close to the Czech attitude. 
The prospects for future liberalization of the visa policy with Ukraine
and Moldova are ﬁrst of all subject to the overriding concerns with
border and state security. Slovakia’s openness to liberal solutions in visa 
aﬀairs also depends on Ukraine’s ability to minimize threats arising
from transnational criminal networks.
The two other Visegrad countries stressed much more strongly their
continuing role in presenting the speciﬁc concerns of the EU’s eastern
borderlands. Both the Hungarian and Polish oﬃcials stressed that, in
view of setbacks in regional cooperation in the pre-accession period, 
trust needed to be built up for consular cooperation to go beyond 
the current level of exchanging information. The experiences of the
oﬃcials at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs with institutionalized
Visegrad cooperation were generally discouraging until accession, as 
they saw Poland isolated in its emphasis on and proactive policy toward 
Ukraine in visa aﬀairs (as well as generally) outside the EU framework.
The decisions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to introduce visas
in 2000, in spite of the Visegrad resolution calling for a harmonized 
policy on the issue, were thus taken as signs of the group’s inability to 
reach consensus.  
Hungarian respondents pointed to the common concern with Poland 
that increased EU harmonization involves increasingly strict regulations 
which are likely to make travel of third country nationals into the EU 
more diﬃcult. Of primary concern are the ﬁnancial resources needed
Poland isolated in its emphasis 
on and proactive policy toward 
Ukraine
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for cross-border travel: upon full accession to Schengen, Hungary and 
Poland will no longer be able to oﬀer visas free of charge. Visa fees will
be harmonized at a level that might be prohibitive for citizens of the 
two countries’ eastern neighbors. Hungary and Poland believe that it is 
also in the other Visegrad countries’ interest to push for the possibility 
of oﬀering lower, preferential visa fees for speciﬁc groups of travelers
following Schengen accession. Some visa facilitation on the basis of the 
Kaliningrad example seems to be a likely line of argument vis-à-vis the 
other EU members (where EU-Russia negotiations on visa facilitation 
could be taken as a precedent). 
Another issue which has been raised by the Hungarian oﬃcials
interviewed is an EU initiative to harmonize entry conditions of third 
country nationals to EU Member States, which would include setting 
a common level for the required means of ﬁnancial subsistence. The
current plans for required ﬁnancial means are in the range of €30
to €100 a day. Making entry conditional on the possession of such 
amounts of money could prevent many members of the Hungarian 
minorities and other Ukrainian nationals from entering Hungary. (The
current amount required by Hungary is HUF 1000, i.e., around €4 per 
day). Besides the much lower wage levels in these countries, applying 
the same requirement on ﬁnancial means across the board would also
be unreasonable, since most travelers to Hungary who are members of 
the Hungarian minority stay with relatives and not in hotels. Hungary 
and other new members on the external border should try to push for 
a diﬀerent approach to third states within the EU, treating nationals of
countries with close ties to EU members diﬀerently.
An area of agreement among the respondents from all of the four 
states is that, without political will at the national government level, 
change in the scope of V4 cooperation cannot be expected. So far, 
political initiatives have been conﬁned to common declarations about
early accession to the second phase of the Schengen acquis. However, 
these declarations had very limited practical eﬀect. Respondents agreed
that the appropriate forum for introducing new ideas should involve the 
Upon full accession to 
Schengen visa fees will be 
harmonized at a level that 
might be prohibitive
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ministries of foreign aﬀairs since they bear the main responsibility for
consular and visa policy, but should also rely on cabinet level decisions. 
5 . 2  W h y  S h o u l d  t h e  V 4  C o u n t r i e s  C o o p e r a t e  
  i n  t h e  V i s a  Po l i c y  F i e l d ? 
Among the potential beneﬁts of various forms of continued Visegrad
cooperation in visa aﬀairs, those oﬃcials interviewed see both ﬁnancial
and political advantages. For smaller states, a possible budgetary gain 
could be realized by sharing resources and through the common 
processing of visa applications. For Hungary or Slovakia, for instance, 
it may be beneﬁcial to be represented in all locations, including ones
where they currently have no national consular representation, without 
having to maintain consular posts or build up the required technical 
infrastructure. There may also be a time advantage in the context of
slowly developing ideas in the EU on “euro-consulates,” as cooperation 
among the V4 would probably take less time to formalize and thus allow 
the four countries to be forerunners among EU Member States. Finally, 
there is a not negligible advantage arising from the fact that bilateral 
relations with the third countries concerned are likely to improve as 
access to visas becomes easier.
For Poland, enhancing consular cooperation could be a means of 
promoting its vision of eastern policy. Warsaw currently feels relatively 
isolated in its continued eﬀorts to bring Ukraine closer to the EU.
The support of its Visegrad partners would give an important boost to
Poland’s credibility in Kyiv’s eyes, as well as constituting a political gain 
in demonstrating progress towards a balanced eastern dimension to EU 
foreign policy. Poland could also beneﬁt from demonstrating its ability
to cooperate with the other new Member States prior to a simultaneous 
entry into Schengen.
On the other hand, the Czech Republic will be the only new 
Member State with no external Schengen border. While this position 
Allow the four countries 
to be forerunners among  
EU Member States
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appears to make the Czech Republic a “net winner,” “net beneﬁciary”
or even “free rider” of the system, and account for the lower priority of 
the Schengen agenda in Czech policymaking, it also grants the country 
certain ﬂexibility to bargain in this regard. The Czech Republic could
thus relatively easily earn some political capital that may be “traded in” 
in future negotiations on the EU level. 
In fact, Czech-Slovak relations could represent the easiest and most 
natural relationship for consular cooperation as it would build on a 
common precedence of sharing and/or coordinating diplomatic and 
consular premises. After the “negotiated divorce” of Czechoslovakia, 
the two successor states had to divide diplomatic services. In practice, 
this frequently meant splitting diplomatic and consular premises (if 
separable) or temporarily sharing the only building for diplomatic 
services of both new states. Although this co-existence did not last long 
(the prestige of the new states required full and standard diplomatic 
representation), the experience might provide a basis for future practical 
cooperation between consular oﬃces.
5 . 3  O b s t a c l e s  t o  F u r t h e r  C o o p e r a t i o n
Notwithstanding Ukraine’s diplomatic eﬀorts, the new EU Member
States have been constrained in their ability to bring about a change 
in the attitudes of EU institutions and pre-2004 Member States. The
interviewed oﬃcials noted a clear mismatch between the ambitious
European agenda the Yushchenko administration put forward as 
it came into power in Ukraine and the more reserved stance of the 
EU concerning the visa issue. Ukrainian demands for “liberalization” 
contrasted sharply with the “facilitation” or “ﬂexibilization” of visa
relations oﬀered by the EU. While liberalization would require a change
in the acquis, facilitation is described as a modiﬁcation of practice
within limits set by Schengen rules. It may be concluded that, although 
the Schengen acquis (and EU law in general) did not eliminate national 
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policies, the freedom of maneuver it leaves for Member States is far less 
than that expected by eastern neighbors and Ukraine in particular. 
Most oﬃcials interviewed in the V4 countries were skeptical
about the possibility of Visegrad visa cooperation for their eastern 
neighbors. They emphasized that Schengen accession is the priority,
and consequently V4 frameworks were more likely used, if anything, for 
aligning preparations for Schengen entry. Some see a potential conﬂict
between Schengen accession and V4 visa cooperation, arguing that 
regional harmonization of visa policy implementation in a subgroup 
below the EU-level would be against the (spirit of the) acquis, even 
in the limited areas still under national competence. Thus, the only
possible form of cooperation would be to jointly apply pressure towards 
preferred common EU action in visa policy.
Other potential obstacles to visa cooperation, in the respondents’ 
view, included the time needed to develop such a scheme, concerns 
about possible loss of national sovereignty, and technical and data 
protection problems in harmonizing procedures. Oﬃcials also felt that
it would be too costly to harmonize national practices in the few areas 
still in national competence, and incurring these costs is unnecessary as 
the issues will be covered by EU harmonization in the future. 
Internal diﬀerences of interests among the Visegrad countries should
also be considered. It was suggested that the V4 would not be the best 
forum for harmonizing visa policy towards eastern neighbors given the 
diﬀerent situation of the Czech Republic from the other V4 countries.
In fact, new Member States located along the eastern border of the 
EU had more interests in common than the four Visegrad countries. 
Other divisions separated big states from small states (Poland vs. the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and countries with signiﬁcant
national minorities outside the EU border from states without such a 
minority (Hungary vs. Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic). 
Some recent broader political developments could have a further 
negative impact on opportunities for cooperation. The political
uncertainty related to the elections in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Schengen accession is  
the priority
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Hungary in 2005/2006 limits the chances of new political initiatives 
from the current governments of these countries. In addition, the 
fallout from the German visa scandal and the outcomes of the French 
and Dutch referendums raise the political costs and risks associated 
with any proposal to facilitate access to the Union by travelers from 
countries to the East.
6 .  E V A L U AT I N G  C O N C R E T E  WAY S  TO  E N H A N C E  
 C O O P E R AT I O N  A N D  F A C I L I TAT E  A C C E S S
6 . 1  S o l u t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  V i s e g r a d  G r o u p
In the course of the ﬁeld research, oﬃcials in the V4 ministries
interviewed were asked to evaluate the prospects of the following three 
potential forms of cooperation among Visegrad states to facilitate the 
movement of Moldovan and Ukrainian nationals:
a) requiring no transit visa from travelers possessing short-term visas 
for other EU Member States (in particular Visegrad); 
b) requiring no short-term visa from travelers with legal residence in 
another EU Member State (in particular Visegrad);
c) consular representations of Visegrad countries accepting applications 
from citizens of Ukraine and Moldova for short-term visas to other 
Visegrad countries, carrying out interviews, forwarding applications 
to the destination state for ﬁnal decisions with a suggestion, and
issuing the visa to the applicant (“partial representation”).
The ﬁrst two of the proposals are not far removed from current
practices and yet they could have a positive impact in the short term 
(or at least until the V4’s Schengen accession). In fact, the current visa 
agreements between Poland and Hungary on the one hand and Ukraine 
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on the other include a clause similar to options a) and b) with respect to 
Schengen states. Ukrainian nationals who hold a short-term Schengen 
visa do not need a transit visa to travel through Poland or Hungary, 
and those who hold a long-term Schengen visa or residence permit 
do not need a short-term visa for Poland or Hungary. Although these 
clauses violate the Schengen acqui; they have been thus far overlooked 
by the EU because a proposal has long been on the table to enable new 
Member States to accept Schengen visas as national visas even before 
their Schengen accession. The question is whether such a decision can
be reached and implemented before the Schengen accession of Visegrad 
countries.
The third proposal is more controversial. Firstly, some possible
practical questions emerged such as the question of how the circulation 
of documents would be compatible with the short deadlines on issuing 
visas currently oﬀered by Hungary and Poland. Possible communication
problems in application procedures and the divergent staﬀ training
procedures have also been indicated. More importantly, however, 
oﬃcials interviewed generally saw no need for partial representation
since, in their view, the current system is suﬃcient for meeting demand
for visas in Ukraine and Moldova. Questions have also been raised as to 
whether partial representation would make sense at all after Schengen 
enlargement: since visa conditions would have to be harmonized, a 
more ambitious form of cooperation, full representation by another 
state, would make more sense. This would not only bring greater
budgetary advantages, but would also assure that the country with 
direct experience in the location would make the decision. Partial 
representation could also be made obsolete by the long-term perspective 
of a common European consular body. 
While partial representation among Visegrad states may not be 
feasible or even desirable, the oﬃcials concerned identiﬁed exchange of 
information to improve eﬀorts to combat casesof fraudulent applications
as one area where enhanced V4 cooperation would be highly beneﬁcial.
Several interviewed oﬃcials raised the idea of sharing information
No need for partial 
representation
Exchange of information 
to improve efforts to 
combat cases of fraudulent 
applications
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about a person expelled from a V4 country even before accession to the 
Schengen II system, noting also with regret that currently there is no 
standard procedure for the mutual exchange of lists of rejected persons 
between the embassies/consulates of V4 countries.
6 . 2  S h a p i n g  E U  Po l i c y
An area of possible cooperation mentioned by oﬃcials was joint
promotion on the EU level of visa facilitation for nationals of Ukraine. 
Possible policy proposals could range from securing preferential 
treatment for Ukrainians (e.g. reduced visa fees or multiple-entry visas 
for certain groups of travelers, such as residents of border regions) to 
the long-term aim of removing the country from the EU “black list.” In 
light of persisting concerns in several EU countries over dropping visa 
requirements for countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, an alternative 
approach would be for the Visegrad countries to push for clear criteria 
for placing and removing countries from the black list. This way the
EU decision could be based on monitoring and rewarding countries 
individually, rather than opaque political decisions and possible double 
standards regarding a group of countries. However, few practical 
measures concerning either EU policy towards Ukraine speciﬁcally or
the black list generally have appeared as part of the Visegrad agenda 
so far. This is perhaps not surprising as there is no agreement on the
question as to whether a visa exemption for Ukraine was indeed a 
shared interest of all four Visegrad countries. 
A precondition of any form of visa facilitation by the EU towards 
Ukraine would be the strengthening of Ukrainian border controls 
and the conclusion of an EU-Ukraine readmission agreement, with 
which the existing bilateral and EU-level agreements would then have 
to be harmonized. An EU-Ukraine readmission agreement would in 
turn raise the question of Ukraine’s porous eastern borders and the 
conclusion of a Russia-Ukraine readmission agreement. Consequently, 
Clear criteria for placing 
and removing countries from 
the black list
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one way to increase Ukraine’s chances for qualifying for the EU’s 
“white list” is to step up cooperation and assistance to Ukraine for 
improving border management on its eastern and northern borders, 
which is in the common interests of both the EU and the Visegrad 
countries. To make EU assistance more eﬃcient, it would be reasonable
to “internationalize” existing JHA support given separately to Poland, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine. 
The Visegrad countries could also help Ukraine more in the area of
early prevention of illegal migration, for instance through joint training 
programs on border protection standards for representatives of border 
services from both the Visegrad states and Ukraine. Such programs 
should include representatives from police and judicial bodies as well, 
aimed at facilitating cooperation and coordinated action between them 
in the ﬁeld of JHA. The Visegrad countries could support the idea of
having permanent liaison oﬃcers from Ukraine at the respective border
control units on their borders with Ukraine and vice versa.
However, in the long run, visa policy needs to be dissociated 
from questions of illegal migration or criminality. Visa policy towards 
Ukraine and Moldova has been interconnected, and is to some extent 
mixed up with, the issue of illegal migration and protection of the EU 
external border in the public debate. Thus, a communication strategy
would need to be developed to improve the public’s understanding of 
the issues involved. The Visegrad countries could play an active part
in the EU JHA debate to shape, and potentially correct, still pervasive 
negative “Schengen stereotypes.” 
6 . 3  U s i n g  N a t i o n a l  V i s a  Po l i c i e s
Notwithstanding EU action, it must also be remembered that the 
Visegrad countries will be authorized to issue national long-term visas 
for third-country citizens (multiple-entry visas valid for a stay of up 
to six months within one year) even if they join the Schengen Treaty 
Step up cooperation and 
assistance to Ukraine for 
improving border management 
Joint training programs on 
border protection standards
Visa policy needs to be 
dissociated from questions of 
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by 2007. This solution could be applied to address the needs of the
borderlands in easy cross-border movement of local residents. 
The Hungarian policy aimed at easing the travel of ethnic
Hungarians outside its borders may be a good example in this respect. 
In the aftermath of the unsuccessful referendum in Hungary on 
granting Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians (which would 
have made them double citizens), Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány 
announced the introduction of a new type of residence visa (“D” type 
visa), the so-called national visa, that aimed at easing travel for ethnic 
Hungarians (in particular minorities living in Serbia and Montenegro 
and Ukraine) into Hungary. In June 2005, the Hungarian Parliament 
amended the 2001 Act on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners accordingly 
and, as of January 2006, the special residence visas—valid for ﬁve years
for multiple entries and for practically unlimited stays—will become 
available. To comply with community rules, these visas will not entitle 
the holder to work or study in Hungary.
Similar precedents exist in the Schengen area, e.g., the speciﬁc visa
arrangements for local border traﬃc between the two Spanish provinces
Ceuta and Melila and the two bordering Moroccan provinces Tetuan 
and Nador. This option should be seriously considered by the Visegrad
countries in terms of its eventual application to Ukrainian citizens living 
in bordering regions along the future EU eastern border. However, it 
would only be a feasible option provided that the Ukrainian authorities 
prove their ability to ensure that the issuing of residence certiﬁcates for
Ukrainian citizens in their respective regions is transparent and free 
from abuse. 
To address the needs 
of the borderlands
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C O N C L U S I O N S
Prospects for aligning V4 consular and visa policies towards Ukraine 
and Moldova are far from rosy. The four countries do not consider
themselves as natural allies. Instead, they seek the partnership of other 
EU Member States—like Germany for Poland or Austria for Hungary—
or are waiting for EU-level solutions, such as the initiative to create a 
European diplomatic service by November 2006 or the adoption of the 
draft Council Regulation on local border traﬃc.
Although all the Visegrad states eased access to visas for Ukrainian 
citizens following Ukraine’s recent goodwill measures towards the EU, 
diﬀerences persist among the four countries’ general approach. On the
one hand, the Czech Republic and Slovakia introduced visas earlier, 
citing EU accession requirements and perceiving visas primarily as 
a security measure. This position, close to that of most EU Member
States and the Commission itself, makes the visa-issuing process the ﬁrst
barrier against potential illegal immigrants and is most concerned with 
the protection of domestic labor markets and social security systems. 
On the other hand, Hungary and Poland—responsible for some of the 
longest stretches of the external EU border—generally consider visas 
not so much a tool to ﬁght transborder crime but as instruments of
foreign policy. The two countries delayed imposing visa obligations on
Ukrainian nationals, and also sought to mitigate negative consequences 
for cross-border traﬃc from countries of particular importance by
investing in and expanding their consular networks and by facilitating 
access to their visas. In the current asymmetric regimes Polish visas are 
free for Ukrainians and Moldovans, and Hungarian visas for nationals 
of Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro. 
As a result of these diﬀerences in approach and outlook, current
national visa policy arrangements vary far more among the four states 
than they did in either 2000 or 2003, and this situation is likely to 
remain unchanged for some time. The Czech Republic and Slovakia
have consistently aﬃrmed that any cooperation in JHA should be
Prospects for aligning V4 
policies are far from rosy
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conducted within the EU framework, and have generally been content 
with the Commission’s proposals for the European Neighborhood 
Policy. Poland and Hungary have their own particular reasons for 
adopting more liberal solutions: in the former case, it is a comprehensive 
“eastern foreign policy,” and the latter, the importance of maintaining 
close relations with ethnic Hungarians and the states in which they 
live around the Carpathian Basin. This may explain why only Poland
extended the preferential, asymmetric solution to Moldova and, in turn, 
why the issue of local border traﬃc was of somewhat more interest to
Hungary. 
National perceptions also diﬀer as to whether, to what extent, and
why the current disparate visa policies should be harmonized. Poland, 
which issues more visas to Ukrainian residents than all three of the 
other states combined, looks not so much for ﬁnancial or logistical
savings as broader support for its “eastern policy” and more speciﬁcally
ideas on oﬀering Ukraine a European perspective, with the latter
objective shared, perhaps with lesser intensity, by Hungary. The Czech
Republic and Slovakia are primarily interested in quick integration into 
the Schengen system and the abolition of controls on internal borders. 
Nevertheless, continued EU integration has led to intensiﬁed
technical and operational cooperation among the ministries of the 
interior, foreign ministries, border guards and police forces of the four 
states, which gave some momentum to ﬂagging Visegrad cooperation
itself. The institutions involved in implementing the JHA and Schengen
acquis maintain frequent contact both within the Visegrad framework 
and at EU forums. The four states agreed to submit a single application
for simultaneous evaluation of compliance with Schengen standards; 
anticipating joint entry in 2007. EU accession has also encouraged 
the Visegrad Group to deﬁne some tangible issues in which their
common voice would represent added value to their national eﬀorts.
The common statement by the foreign ministers of the four states on
the situation in Ukraine, issued on December 7, 2004, and the decision 
to send observers to the elections reﬂected renewed interest in Ukraine’s
Common statement 
by the foreign ministers 
of the four states
Intensiﬁed technical and
operational cooperation 
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stability.
In the short to medium term, limited, trial forms of on-demand 
bilateral cooperation—such as exchanging information, forwarding 
applications, helpdesks at another state’s consulate—could be 
introduced in selected locations and areas where such schemes would 
clearly improve access to the visa procedures for a signiﬁcant number of
applicants. These practical measures would be at best partial solutions,
which, given the V4’s integration into the Schengen system within the 
next few years, could even be seen as diverting resources and eﬀorts
from Schengen accession or as inferior to proposals tabled at the EU 
level. However, partial solutions, based on genuine demand from both 
the Visegrad Group’s eastern neighbors, and a willingness of individual 
Member States, or interest-based coalitions of states, to meet that 
demand are still the most certain way forward.
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PA R T  T H R E E
Key Recommendations
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a .  A g e n d a  f o r  V i s e g r a d  C o o p e r a t i o n  
 o n  t h e  Pa t h  t o  S c h e n g e n  a n d  B e y o n d 
1. Exchanges of best practice should take place regularly both between 
ministries and among consuls of the Visegrad countries. The ﬁrst type
of consultations would involve sharing daily experiences with such 
issues as applicant interview techniques, selection and relations with 
travel agencies, and veriﬁcation of documents from third countries,
while the second would cover required changes in infrastructure, 
work organization and IT support.
2. A regional forum of the consular administrations of the Visegrad 
Group should review procedures currently applied by the consulates 
of the four states and draft the Visegrad Consular Professional 
Standards. This should set guidelines towards customer service best
practices, describing an “ideal consulate of a Visegrad state,” to be 
implemented upon full Schengen accession. 
3. A common list of documents required for the submission of appli-
cations in all the consulates of the four Visegrad countries should 
be drafted prior to entry into Schengen. The agreement would
guarantee that, with the exception of justiﬁed but limited cases
(e.g. suspicion of prior involvement in illegal activities), no other 
documents would be requested by any consular oﬃce. The list
should be made available to applicants through the consulates’ 
websites, telephone information systems, travel agencies and the 
local media.
4. Fast-track visa application procedures could be created on a pilot 
basis at Visegrad consulates as incentives for categories of travelers 
that are of the greatest interest to the Visegrad states such as 
legitimate business people, professionals, students or researchers. 
The procedures would need to cover the entire application process,
starting with online registration with ﬁxed appointment times,
unambiguous lists of required documents, and dedicated times and 
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places for interviews. Once the fast-track application procedures 
are proven to be successful in attracting the most desirable visitors 
and are at the same time safe from abuse, they may be extended to 
all travelers. 
5. As part of the alignment of their national systems with Schengen, 
V4 states should exchange operational information on persons deemed 
undesirable by any of them. Lists of undesirable persons, including the 
reasons for their inclusion in the record (such as past involvement 
in criminal activities, human traﬃcking or illegal employment)
could initially be made available upon request and in time could 
be regularly and routinely shared. While that information would 
not bind consuls to a decision, it would provide an important 
“alarm signal” requiring that the case be reviewed and thoroughly 
checked. 
6. In the period leading up to full inclusion into the Schengen zone, 
each of the Visegrad states should design national medium and long-term 
visa policies covering categories of travelers with more permanent 
ties to these countries, such as students and academics, business 
people, family members or ethnic compatriots. 
7. Measures should be taken to ensure that only genuine tourists or 
persons with explicit and deﬁnite short-term reasons for visits receive
short-term national Schengen visas. As part of preparations for the 
adoption of the Common Consular Instruction, consuls of Visegrad 
states ought to strive to interview each applicant and verify his or 
her actual reason for visiting. 
b .  V i s e g r a d  C o o p e r a t i o n  a n d  U k r a i n e  
 a n d  M o l d o v a
8. In the short to medium term, the national authorities from V4 
states should develop procedures for access for all EU consuls to 
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information on visa applicants’ criminal records, places of residence or 
economic activity status in line with the recommendations contained 
in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. Managing a unique identiﬁcation
system for the citizens of Ukraine and Moldova needs to be included 
in the objectives of broader EU assistance to those states as part of 
migration management collaboration. 
9. Visegrad states should focus EU assistance in the JHA domain to 
Ukraine and Moldova on developing a reliable Ukrainian ID system 
to eliminate the possibility of easily changing personal information. 
This database of Ukrainian passports should be made available to
every EU consul, allowing data to be scanned and the application 
process for customers and consulates to be simpliﬁed by providing
all the necessary information about each traveler. The database
should be set up even prior to the extension of the SIS system 
as currently not all V4 countries have online systems integrated 
with police records that would help detect forged identiﬁcation
documents.
10. Visegrad Border Guard services should develop common multilateral 
programs for training their Ukrainian counterparts in detecting 
forged documents and verifying the purpose of travel to lower the 
number of persons refused entry. 
c .  V i s e g r a d  A g e n d a  f o r  t h e  E U  a n d  S c h e n g e n
11. Collaboration should be intensiﬁed with existing successful schemes
involving other EU members, such as the Salzburg Forum or the 
Baltic states. Bringing in “old” EU members would reinforce the 
notion of the compatibility of multilateral solutions within the EU 
with further integration, including Schengen. 
12. Cooperation within the Visegrad Group or other regional settings 
aimed at improving relations with third countries, such as Ukraine 
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or Moldova, should include a new communication strategy aimed 
at EU Member States, explaining beneﬁts as well as costs expected
from such a step. 
13. The persistent interest of Ukraine’s neighbors as well as of the Czech 
Republic, which has extensive experience with Ukrainian im-
migration, in a balanced, harmonized visa policy in the framework 
of the European Neighborhood Policy should also be communicated 
towards the EU25. Communication with other EU Member States 
should stress the new Member States’ awareness of the speciﬁcity of
East European cross-border movement, as well as their openness to 
cooperation with other EU Member States. 
14. TheVisegrad Group’s public statements should identify and acknowledge
the competencies that some of the V4 states have in speciﬁc policy areas 
and communicate them to the European Commission and “old” EU 
Member States as part of the Visegrad states’ shared commitment 
to developing “friendly border” policies. 
15. The states of the Visegrad Group should propose to the Council and
the Commission that Schengen visas be set at a minimum level, 
substantiated by presenting the beneﬁts of the visa-waiver programs
adopted by the Visegrad states towards Ukraine and by Poland 
towards Moldova.
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The Visegrad States
On the EU’s Eastern Frontier
Consular and Visa Cooperation  
in East Central Europe for Residents of 
Ukraine and Moldova
by Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, Dóra Husz, Juraj Misina & Ivo Slosarcik
Public perceptions of the importance of tackling corruption in 
Southeastern Europe have reached record highs. In the region that 
spearheaded the donor community’s recent focus on anticorruption 
assistance, over ﬁve years of anticorruption projects and high-proﬁle
public awareness campaigns have led to the topic being ﬁrmly implanted
within contemporary political discourse. Anticorruption assistance in 
Southeastern Europe has now reached a crossroads, where perceptions 
of corruption as a major policy issue are high, but results in the ﬁght
against corruption are generally perceived as unsatisfactory. Projects 
have succeeded in raising demand for reform, but solutions to respond 
to this demand have yet to be found. 
The crisis of political representation—citizens lacking trust in their
elected leaders—is the most serious problem facing the Southeastern 
European region. In a recent paper on the state of democracy across 
Southeastern Europe, Ivan Krastev writes that “the growing gap that 
divides publics from elites and the growing mistrust that publics feel 
towards democratic institutions are the most salient political facts 
in the Balkans today.”1 Economic growth in the region as a whole is 
mostly fair to good (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina); it 
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